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CHILDREN AT RISK:
THE INEQUALITY OF URBAN EDUCATION
"The direction in which education starts a man will
determine his future life."'
"Let the revolting distinction of rich and poor
disappear once and for all, the distinction of great
and small, of masters and valets, of governors and
governed .... Since we all have the same needs and
the same facilities, let there be one education for all,
one food for all."'
Over the last decade, voices of the government, educators,
private business, and the general public have cried out that the
academic performance of our nation's schoolchildren has declined
and that our schools are generally failing us.? The accusations ring
particularly true in our urban centers because the quality of
education that is provided to students in poor, urban schools is
inferior to that provided to students in wealthier, suburban schools.4
'PLATO, THE REPUBLIC Book IV 425 (B. Jowett trans. 1986).
2 FRANcoIs NOtL BABEUF (pseudonym GRAcCHus), MANIFESTO OF THE EQUALS
(c.1795) reprinted in JOHN BARTLET, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 414 (Emily Morrison
Beck 15th ed. 1980).
3 JONATHAN KozoL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES, CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 3
(1991) ("Low reading scores, high dropout rates, poor motivation - symptomatic
matters - seem[ I to dominate discussion."). Allen W. Hubsch, Education and SelfGovernment: The Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 18 J. L. & EDUC.
93 (1989). "Parents and taxpayers are increasingly expressing their dissatisfaction
with many aspects of public education - its costs, the role of teachers, curriculum
coverage." M. David Gelfand, Assessing the Challenges to Public Education in the
1980's, 14 THE URBAN LAWYER, Summer 1982, at xi. NATIONAL EDUCATION Assoc.,
FEDERAL EDUCATION FUNDING, THE COST OF EXCELLENCE 1 (June 1991) [hereinafter

THE COST OF EXCELLENCE].
" See generally KOZOL, supra note 3. Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for
Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEx. L. REv. 777, 779
(1985). Litigation has ensued in many states in response to the poor quality of
education offered in most cities. See, e.g., Legal Challenges to Finance Formulas on
Court Dockets in at Least Twelve States, EDUC. WEEK, May 2, 1990, at 14; Finney Vetoes
Bills On Taxes, School Aid, EDUC. WEEK, May 29, 1991, at 18; After Ruling, Focus in
Kansas City Shifts To PuttingPlan Into Action, EDUC. WEEK, May 2, 1990, at 1; Parents
Sue Alabama Over School Financing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1991, at 14; School Crisis
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Due to the greater number of African-Americans and other minorities
who live in urban areas, the impact of this disparity is that the poor
and minorities are not receiving an adequate or equal education6
and as a result minorities are denied the opportunity to break the
cycle of poverty and the redress of disadvantages inflicted by prior
discrimination.7 Students who are not afforded equal educational
opportunity are being limited in their chances of economic, political,
and social success;' the poor and minority children who comprise
Looms in Va., WASH. POST, June 11, 1990, at Al. See also HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC.
AND LABOR, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., A REPORT ON SHORTCHANGING CHILDREN: THE

IMPACT OF FISCAL INEQUITY ON THE EDUCATION OF STUDENTS AT RISK 3 (Comm.

Print Dec., 1990) (prepared by William L. Taylor & Dianne M. Pich6, Esqs.)
[hereinafter SHORTCHANGING CHILDREN].
' S. 3183, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. 14991 (1990) ("[Uirban schools
enroll approximately one-third of Nation's [sic] poor, 40 percent of the Nation's
blacks, and 30 percent of the Nation's Hispanic youth"); see also STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1990 (DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE

CENSUS). Percentages of African-Americans in the nation's cities are far greater than
the percentage of blacks in the general population. For example, in 1980 blacks
constituted 14% of the general population in the United States. In the same year,
blacks constituted 39.8% of the population in Chicago, Illinois, 63.1% in Detroit,
Michigan, 27.6% in Houston, Texas, 57.3% in Inglewood, California, 17% in Los
Angeles, California, 25.2% in New York, New York, 46.9% in Oakland, California,
and 70.3% in Washington, D.C. Id. at 34-38, tables 40, 43. See also SHORTCHANGING
CHILDREN, supra note 4, at ix; Brief of Amicus Curiae, Association for Children of
New Jersey, at 6, Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990) (No. M-1193)
[hereinafter Amicus Brief].
Ratner, supra note 4, at 779.
'Amicus Brief, supra note 5, at 6.
8
NATIONAL COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, A NATION AT RISK (1983)
[hereinafter NATION AT RISK], reprinted in BERNICE & RONALD GROSS, THE GREAT
SCHOOL DEBATE (1985), at 29. "A high school diploma increases annual earnings
for an entry-level job by almost $1,000. A college degree increases annual earnings
for an entry-level job by more than $9,000." THE COST OF EXCELLENCE, supra note
3, at 3. It is likely that in upcoming years education will become even more vital
to economic success.
According to the Congressional Research service, jobs requiring
the highest level of educational attainment will increase far faster
than those at lower levels. By the year 2000, the number of
managerial, professional, and highly technical jobs will increase
by 29 percent; for moderately high level technical, health, and
sales careers, the number of jobs will increase by 20 percent; the
number of moderately low level production, craft, and service
occupations will grow by 14 percent; and the number of
laborers, food preparation, cleaning and maintenance jobs will
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the majority of students in most major cities are being confined to the
lower socio-economic strata, when adequate education could be the
escape hatch for many of them.9
A number of legal strategies are available to challenge the
inequality that exists in urban education. For example, if the
Supreme Court were to afford education the status of a fundamental
right, this disparate treatment would be subject to strict scrutiny
under equal protection analysis and to defend it states would be
required to show both a compelling governmental interest and that
the means used to achieve that interest are necessary or narrowly
tailored to that interest.0 Although education of the citizenry is
most likely compelling, it is improbable that the disparate treatment
of poor, urban schools as contrasted with wealthier, suburban schools
grow by 14 percent.
'Many scholars agree that education could be the first step of the healing
process needed in our cities. "Solutions to the problems of the educationally
disadvantaged must.., reach beyond the traditional boundaries of schooling to
improve the environment of the child. An early and sustained intervention in the
lives of disadvantaged children both in school and out is our only hope for
breaking the cycle of disaffection and despair." THE COST OF EXCELLENCE, supra
note 3, at 3 (quoting COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, INVESTMENT
STRATEGIES FOR THE EDUCATIONALLY DISADVANTAGED (1987)). This is particularly

true in light of recent and future labor trends, see supra note 8. "In recent decades,
as work and daily life in the United States have become more complex and
demanding, education has become a prerequisite for economic self-sufficiency,
personal growth and development, and responsible citizenship." NATIONAL
COMM'N ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC, A NEW AMERICAN AGENDA FOR
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 177 (1991) [hereinafter BEYOND RHETORIC].
10 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (setting out the strict
scrutiny standard); see also Mark J. Kappelhoff, Bowers v. Hardwick: Is There a Right
to Privacy?, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 487, 492 (1988) ("Because fundamental rights are
afforded the highest degree of constitutional protection, the issue of what
constitutes a 'fundamental right' is crucial.") (footnote omitted). See generally,
Stuart Biegel, Reassessing the Applicability of Fundamental Rights Analysis: The
FourteenthAmendment and the Shaping of Educational Policy after Kadrmasv. Dickinson
Public Schools, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1078 (1989); Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling
Governmental Interests: An Essential But Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional
Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917 (1988), [hereinafter Gottlieb, Compelling Interests];
David C. Gottlieb, Note, Of Interests, Fundamental and Compelling: The Emerging
Constitutional Balance, 57 B.U. L. REV. 462 (1977) [hereinafter, Gottlieb, Note, Of
Interests].
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would meet this standard." State governments would, therefore,
be required to raise the quality of urban schools up to a quality equal
to that of wealthier districts. 2 It is unlikely, however, that the
Supreme Court would, with its present conservative posture,
overrule precedent 3 and declare that education is a fundamental
right. A second type of equal protection challenge could be based on
the disparate impact of inadequate urban education on blacks and
other minorities. This argument, however, would most likely be
doomed to failure given the current Court's avowal that disparate
impact is inadequate to sustain a finding of discrimination under the
Equal Protection Clause. 4 Alternative strategies include legislative
reform and state constitutional challenges. For reasons explored in
this Note, while state constitutional challenges to unequal education
have seen some moderate success in individual cases, they do not
offer the uniformity and strength of policy to be gained from setting
a national standard.
This Note will first consider examples of inequities inherent
in urban education. It will then summarize four recent state court
challenges to the unequal education provided in poor, urban schools,
in contrast to wealthier, suburban schools, with the purpose of
exploring the reasons that such challenges remain inadequate to
address the problem. This Note will then analyze the federal
government's existing role in education and offer support for
expanding that role. Finally, two possible routes of enhanced federal
commitment to equity in education will be delineated: first, the legal
support for establishing education as a fundamental right and
second, possible progress in federal legislation. In conclusion, this
Note will propose that the establishment of federal standards is the
preferable method of attacking the inequality of urban education,
thereby forcing the states and localities to provide equal education
to those students in the poorer, urban districts who currently receive
substandard education due to state sanctioned inequality.
u San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (refused to
find that education was a fundamental right, but conceded that if it were, strict
scrutiny would apply and disparate treatment would not meet the standard).
12 Brief for Appellant, San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973) (No. 71-1332).
See San Antonio, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (the disproportionate impact of
pre-employment test did not warrant the conclusion that the test was a purposeful
discriminatory device).
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NOTES

I. THE STATE OFURBAN EDUCATION

In April of 1985, the National Commission on Excellence in
Education, appointed by the Secretary of Education, published A
Nation at Risk.'5 The report sharply criticized American education
as having been overtaken by competitors throughout the world. 6
The report cited frightening statistics: about 13% of all seventeen year
olds in the United States can be considered functionally illiterate;
functional illiteracy among minority youths may-run as high as 40%;
the average achievement of high school students on most
standardized tests is now lower than twenty-six years ago when
Sputnik 7 was launched; the Department of the Navy reported that
25% of its recent recruits cannot read at the ninth grade level, the
minimum needed simply to understand written instructions. 8
Nearly 40% of seventeen year olds cannot draw inferences from
written material; only 20% can write a persuasive essay while only
33% can solve a mathematical problem requiring several steps.'
The report also detailed the Commission's findings with regard to
the deficiencies in curriculum content, teacher expectations, time
allocations, and teacher competency. 20
A Nation at Risk then, made recommendations for
improvement in the areas of curriculum content, standards and
expectations, time allocation, teaching, and leadership and fiscal
support.'21
The report promulgated a wealth of reports by
"commissions, committees, and task forces set up by virtually every
party-at-interest,"' the media hooked into the controversy, and local

GROSS, supra note 8, at 16.
RISK, supra note 8, at 23-49.
1 Sputnik was the first earth satellite and was developed and launched by the
Soviets. This development challenged the long-standing belief that America
retained technological supremacy, and many cast the blame on public education.
In response, the federal government launched a campaign to reform education,
which was considered to have "gone soft." Programs primarily focused on science
and mathematics. DAVID G. ARMSTRONG ET AL., EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION 3940 (2d ed. 1985).
's

16 NATION AT

18 NATION AT RISK, supra note 8, at 26.

19 Id.
2 Id. at 34-37.
21 Id.

at 38-45.
= GROSS, supra note 8, at 17.
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public debate raged.' However, eight years later we have a public
school system in an even more degraded state.' The dangers are
clear. Yet, tangible efforts to combat the failure of our schools often
have been left to school districts without the resources, guidance or
incentive to do so. 25
Exigence is especially apparent in urban schools, which tend
to have lower funding than their suburban counterparts.26
Although many states ensure equal education in theory,' in practice
the education in "some of the poorer urban districts is tragically
inadequate." 2 The recently introduced Urban Schools of America
Act (the USA Act)' enumerates many of the problems facing urban
schools in comparison with other kinds of school systems.3" The list
includes the following: the academic performance of the average
inner city public school system is below that of most other kinds of
school system; urban school systems have higher dropout rates, more
23Id. at 18-19.
2 KOZOL, supra note 3, at 3-5. See also 136 CONG. REC. S14991 (daily ed. Oct. 11,
1990) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy referring to NATION AT RISK, supra note
8); THE COST OF EXCELLENCE, supra note 3, at 1.
' 137 CONG. REC. S448 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
"A decade-long federal disinvestment in public education has hurt the quality of
education - and the quality of life - for millions of American youth. And our
economic and social conditions reflect the damage this disinvestment has wreaked."
THE COST OF EXCELLENCE, supra note 3, at 1.
"For a thorough and moving description of the state of urban schools and the
effect on minority children, see KOZOL, supra note 3, passim. See also NATIONAL
CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, TRENDS IN ACADEMIC PROGRESS

(1991).

Although the gap between the performance of white and African-American nine
and thiteen year olds did diminish, the performance of African-American students
was significantly below that of white students in 1990. Also, Hispanic students
have a lower average proficiency than their white counterparts, although the gap
for thirteen year olds decreased from 1977 to 1990. Id. at 4.
' Most states have educational provisions in their constitutions, and many state
courts construe education to be a fundamental right, pursuant to the state
education and equal protection clauses. See infra notes 68-82 and accompanying
text, for further discussion of the states' constitutional provisions of education.
2'Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 395 (N.J. 1990). Scholars generally agree that
achievement in school must reach the eighth grade level, in order to be considered
adequate. Ratner, supra note 4, at 787 n.30 (citing Penelope A. Preovolos, Rodriguez
Revisited: Federalism,Meaningful Access, and the Right to Adequate Education,20 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 75, 115 (1980)); Ellen Borgersen, Project, Educationand the Law: State
Interests and Individual Rights, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1373, 1394 (1976).
"S.3183, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. 14991, 14992 (1990).
30Id.

NOTES
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problems with health care and lower parental participation; shortages
of teachers in urban school systems are 2.5 times greater and urban
preschoolers have one-half the access to early childhood development
programs as do other children.3' Also alarming is that declining
numbers of urban minority high school graduates are pursuing
postsecondary educational opportunities.32 In addition, urban
school systems have greater problems with teen pregnancy,
discipline, drug abuse and gangs.' The school buildings are in
disrepair and thus create poor and demoralizing working and
learning conditions with 75% of urban school buildings over twentyfive years old and 33% over fifty years old.' The quality of urban
education also has a direct effect on the economic development of the
nation's inner cities and successful increase of the achievement of
minority students will "determine the ability of the Nation to close
the gap between the 'haves and have-nots' in society."'
Analogous findings have been embodied in other studies as
well. For example, the National Commission on Children recently
reported that among thirteen year old African-American students in
the mid-1980s, 33% of girls and 44% of boys were one or more years
behind their expected grade level.' 6 Among Hispanic youth during
the same period, 35% of girls and 40% of boys had been held back
one or more years in school, while only 22% of white girls and 33%
of white boys had been held back.37 Dropout rates are -also
significantly higher in many of the nation's major cities; for example,
"Chicago's dropout rate in recent years was approximately 40%,
while Detroit's was nearly as high."'' According to figures based on
nationally standardized achievement tests,39 in 1981, "approximately
one out of four New York City students in grades two through eight
31Id. In Chicago, for example, the dropout rate has been reported as 50 percent.

KOZOL, supra note 3, at 54. Additionally, "[n]early 1,000 infants die within these
very poor Chicago neighborhoods each year." Id. at 43.
32 Id.
3Id.
34

S.3183, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CoNG. REc. 14991, 14992 (1990).

35

Id.

36BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 9, at 180.
37

Id.

38Id.

9Ratner, supra note 4, at 786 n.25 (citing NEW YORK CrrY BOARD OF EDUCATION
SCHOOL PROFiLES

1980-1981).
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was at least one year below grade level in reading and
mathematics."' By seventh grade, one out of every two students
was one year or more below grade level in mathematics. 1 Most
significant is the fact that these percentages correlate closely with the
percentages of poor and minority students attending the schools.'
Schools with high percentages of students one, two, or more years
below grade level had high percentages of poor children and racial
minorities.' Other New York City schools, whose student bodies
were comprised of few minorities and more affluent children,
showed far lower percentages of students who were one or more
years below grade level." Nationwide studies reflect the same
trend: "[Ploor and minority students
fare worse in the classroom than
'5
students."
white
and
wealthier
Recently, state courts have begun to recognize the crisis level
to which urban education has fallen.' The New Jersey Supreme
Court's analysis of the degradation of urban schools in Abbott v.
Burke' is exemplary.' In Abbott, the New Jersey Supreme Court
40Id. at

788.

,t
Id. In the same study, it has been found that "71% of the students in one or
more grades in some New York City school serving grades two through six were
one year or more below grade level in reading or mathematics, and as many as
45% were two years or more below." Id. at 790.
2
4

Id.

' Id. at 791-92. "For a student to be classified as poor, his family's gross income
had to be less than $10,244 per year for a family of four, unless the family incurred
'special hardship costs (such as excessive medical expenses)."' Id. at 791 n.40.
"Id.
Ratner, supra note 4, at 792. See generally NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF
EDUCATION PROGREs, THREE NATIONAL ASSESSMENTS OF READING: CHANGES IN
PERFORMANCE, 1970-1980 (1983); NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISnCS,
DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, 1982 (1982); NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL
STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISnCS, 1983-84 (1984).
"See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 373 (N.J. 1990). State court challenges
usually claim that the funding schemes employed by the state result in an
inequitable provision of education. For a full discussion of Abbott and other state
court challenges, see infra notes 67-219 and accompanying text.
4 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
' New Jersey School Finance Unconstitutional, Court Says, 18 SCHOOL L. NEWS,
June 7,1990, at 3 ("In an interview, [Marilyn] Morheuser, [Executive Director of the
Education Law Center, Newark, New Jersey] called the ruling 'revolutionary,'
saying it recognizes the very special needs of disadvantaged children, that those
children need more with regard to their education resources than children in
affluent districts.").
's
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held that the funding scheme used by New Jersey was
unconstitutional because it did not provide a comprehensive
education (as mandated by the state constitution) to certain urban
districts.4 9 The court went to great length to enumerate and
describe factors which contribute to the disparate quality of
education provided by New Jersey.'o Similar factors are present in
other states where the same kind of unequal treatment is systemic.5'
The limited opportunities in poorer urban districts range from
inadequacy of safe physical facilities, to an antiquated curriculum
compared to that of the suburban districts.5 2 In addition, teachers
in urban districts tend to be the least experienced, as well as the
lowest paid.' The student/teacher ratios and the education level
of teachers are far superior in the suburban districts.'
Additionally, the students in poor, urban districts tend to
have greater educational needs than students in the suburbs.'
Urban children start school at a disadvantage due to the needs that
arise from "a life led in an environment of violence, poverty, and
despair."'
Several factors which heighten their needs include
poverty, cultural limitations experienced by ethnic minorities, limited
English proficiency, being raised in single-parent families or by
poorly educated parents, or having a disabling condition. 7
According to the National Commission on Children, at least 40% of
American children are affected by one or more of these factors. '
Poverty affects school performance by placing children at greater risk
of health and nutritional problems that can limit their abilities to
concentrate and also disrupt school attendance.'
These factors
tend to increase stress for children, particularly when they result in
a lack of cultural continuity between home and school.'o
Such
49

Abbott, 575 A.2d at 412.

50Id. at 395-403.

" KOZOL, supra note 3, at 1-6. See also Ratner, supra note 4, at 787-94.
s2Abbott, 575 A.2d at 395-98.
53Id. at 399-400.
- Id.
s Id. at 366-67; see also Ratner, supra note 4, at 787-94.
s Abbott, 575 A.2d at 400. See KOZOL, supra note 3, for a shocking description

of such circumstances.
57

BEYOND RHETORIc, supra note 9, at 181-82.
at 182.

5' Id.

5 Id.
60 Id. at 184.
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stress can limit children's academic achievement and can "limit
'
parents' ability to reinforce children's classroom experiences."61
Many of the poorer students do not have books at home 62 and
often do not even have a well-lit surface on which to do
homework.' The schools which these students must endure often
do not even offer a comparable education to that in the suburbs, let
alone address the disadvantages experienced by urban students."
In effect, the students who need the most are getting the least from
their schools.'
These problems are, in effect, denying urban students equal
and adequate education. They must not be permitted to continue,
for fear of losing an entire generation to illiteracy and academic and
social failure.' For reasons that will be revealed in the subsequent
discussion, even plaintiffs' successful state court challenges are
inadequate to remedy such inequity. The federal government's role
should be expanded, setting national standards of quality and
equality, in order to address the plight of urban education.67

61

62

Id.
Abbott, 575 A.2d at 402.

' Author's own observation, New Brunswick, New Jersey school system, fall

1988.
"Abbott, 575 A.2d at 408.
6Id. at 366-67.
"Ratner, supra note 4, at 861 ("The widespread assumption that the failure of
poor and minority students in urban public schools is inevitable must be
overcome.").
67

EDUCATIONAL VISIONS SEMINAR OF THE NEW WORLD FOUNDATION,
PROGRESSIVE FEDERALISM: NEW IDEAS FOR DISTRIBUTING MONEY AND POWER IN

EDUCATION 429 (1984) [hereinafter EDUCATIONAL VISIONS SEMINAR], reprinted in
GROSS, supra note 8, at 419-35 "[The issues of democratic reform in education

suggest that a reordering of intergovernmental relations, a rethinking of the
federalist structure, could provide a step forward." Id. at 420. "Reagan's success in
divesting federal responsibility for education is not a reason for abandoning the
arena.... In setting objectives for a renewed federal role, we should not only seek
to restore. . . but to extend the interrelation of the federal and state activity." Id. at
429 (emphasis added).
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II. STATE COURT INEQUITY CHALLENGES

A. ConstitutionalProtections
Most states have included explicit protection for public
education in their constitutions.'
These constitutional articles
usually insure that the state will provide public education for a
certain number of years.69 Some constitutional provisions even
guarantee a specific quality of education.7
For example, New
Jersey's constitution explicitly provides a "thorough and efficient
education."' Provisions such as these reflect the states' recognition
of the critical nature of education' and impose on those states an
61See ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1; ARK. CONST. art.
XIV,§ 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; CONN. CoNsT. art. VIII,

§ 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CoNST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; HAW.
CONST. art. IX, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CoNsT. art. X, § 1; IND. CoNsT.
art. VIII, § 1; IOWA CoNsT. art. ix 2nd, § 2; KAN. CoNsT. art. VI, § 1; KY. CONsT. §
183; LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME. CONST. art. 8, § 1; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MASS.
CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CoNST. art. XIII, § 1; Mo.
CONST. art. 9, § 1(a); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1; NEV.
CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83; N.J. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 4; N.M. CONST.
art XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 1; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 3; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3;
PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; S.D.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH
CoNsT. art. X, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 68; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST.
art. IX, § 1; W.VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; Wis. CONST. art. X, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. VII,
§ 1. See generally Ratner, supra note 4, at 814.
' Examples include ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1;
CONN. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. IX, § 1; KAN. CoNsr. art. VI, § 1; LA.
CoNsT. art. VIII, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1; N.M. CONST. art XII, § 1; N.Y.
CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONsT. art. IX, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; S.C. CONSr.
art. XI, § 3; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 68.
70ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; COLO. CONST. art IX, § 2; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1;
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; KY. CoNsT. § 183; MD. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; N.J. CONST. art.
VIII, § 4; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; OHIO CoNsT. art. VI, § 3; OR. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; TENN CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEx. CoNsT. art. VII, § 1; VA.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3.
" N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
7 Ratner, supra note 4, at 817.
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affirmative duty to provide education.'h As declared in Brown v.
Board of Education, states that have assumed this duty have afforded
to their citizens a right to education which must be available "to all
' The inadequate education often provided in poor,
on equal terms."74
urban districts is a violation of that duty.7'
Since the Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio v.
Rodriguez,76 many plaintiffs have relied on state constitutions to
bring actions challenging the inequity of urban education.' Most
such cases attack the school funding schemes that are employed by
the states.' Plaintiffs, typically parents of children who attend the
poorer, urban schools, argue that the disparate funding of urban
schools causes the lower quality of education offered in such schools,
'r Id. at 816; Hubsch, supra note 3, at 97-98, 115 ("State governments have not
only assumed the duty to educate in their constitutions, but have assumed the
practical financial responsibility for education as well.").
7' Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (emphasis added).
r Ratner, supra note 4, at 780-81.
76411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education not a fundamental right under federal
Constitution). San Antonio precluded virtually all federal court review of
disparities in education due to unequal funding. See infra, note 282.
"7"State courts have begun to emerge as a mechanism for enforcement of
educational entitlements." Hubsch, supra note 3, at 93.
78 There is an entire body of law concerning school finance. While the subject
is too vast to examine fully in this Note, four of the most recent cases will be
discussed. The basic structure of school finance is as follows: It has been reported
that local governments currently contribute 44% of the total dollars spent on public
education, states supply approximately 50% and the federal government contributes
6.4%. SHORTCHANGING CHILDREN, supra note 4, at 3; see also Richard Briffault, Our
Localism: PartI - The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COL. L.REv. 1, 60 (1990)
("The shift to state financing could promote interlocal equality by reducing the
significance of local wealth in determining local spending."). Local governments
raise most of the revenue for their schools by taxing real property.
SHORTCHANGING CHILDREN, supra note 4, at 4 n.8. Accordingly, districts with
higher property valuation have a greater ability to raise funds for schools and other
local services than the districts with low property valuation. In many states this
method of school support has resulted in a great disparity in the resources
available to various school districts within a state. Id. at 5. Although most states
now contribute substantial portions of a school's costs, the disparities often go
unabated and have elicited strong debate regarding school finance reform. State
funding methods are generally based on a system of grants to local school districts.
Some grants attempt to equalize funding that varies from district to district; others
are merely supplemental to locally raised funds. For an in-depth explanation of
school finance systems, see generally JOHN AUGENBLICK, SCHOOL FINANCE: A
PRIMER (1991) (draft copy on file at N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs.).
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ultimately denying the constitutionally mandated level of and
equality of education." Challenges have alleged that funding
systems that result in gross disparities violate education articles' of
state constitutions and/or state equal protection clauses which mirror
that of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.' Although there is no true regional or chronological
pattern to the cases,82 the most recent ones serve as the best
examples of both successful challenges and the obstacles which
inhibit enforcement and reform.
B. Recent Cases Striking School Finance Systems
In the past two years, the highest courts in four states have
invalidated school finance systems.' The courts' decisions have
" See e.g., Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Montana, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989),
modified, 784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990); Rose v. Council for a Better Educ., Inc, 790 S.W.
2d 186 (Ky. 1989); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. V. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777
S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
8' Ratner, supra note 4, at 847.
Some state courts apply the federal 'explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution' test for determining what rights
are fundamental under the respective state's constitution. When
state courts apply this test to education, however, they usually
reach a result opposite from the federal courts. The reason for
the difference is simple: although the federal constitution does
not explicitly protect education, virtually all state constitutions
do. Under this test, education as a fundamental right under
state equal protection clauses.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Another critic states, "These state courts have mainly
reacted to previously articulated federal doctrines, especially federal equal
protection analysis, rather than created anything wholly original with respect to
education rights." Hubsch, supra note 3, at 94.
2 William E. Thro, Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional
Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REv. 1639, 1642-43
(1989).
3 SHORTCHANGING CHILDREN, supra note 4, at 1. During the 1970s, a few state
courts did declare that their school finance laws were unconstitutional. These cases
provided an analytical foundation for the more recent decisions. California and
Washington are two examples. See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971);
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978), rev'g Northshore
Sch. Dist. v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978). In Serrano, the California Supreme
Court decided that the quality of a child's education must be based on the wealth
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drawn a great deal of public attention as well as repeated efforts by
state legislatures to comply with court orders.
In Helena Elementary School Districtv. Montana," the Supreme
Court of Montana affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding
that the school finance system was unconstitutional.' The plaintiffs
had challenged the constitutionality of the 1985-86 method of funding
the 545 school districts in Montana.' The funding scheme provided
for a general fund which comprised 70% of the schools' funding, in
addition to nine other types of budgeted funds, some of which were
dependent on voter levies, all of which were primarily funded on the
district or city level. s7 The revenues were derived from taxable
property in each city and state aid from sources such as direct
legislative appropriation.'
In addition to the general fund, most school districts adopted
budgets derived from property tax levies voted upon by each district.
Also, districts utilized vehicle tax, interest income, tuition income,
of the state as a whole, not by the wealth of the local school district. Additionally,
contrary to the Supreme Court's decision with regard to federal rights in San
Antonio, the California court decided that under the state constitution education is
a fundamental right and that wealth is a suspect class, invoking strict scrutiny of
the disparities in the provision of education. See infra notes 283-85 and
accompanying text. California has since been able to maintain equalized finance
so that approximately 95% of all students attend districts with a per pupil revenue
limit within an inflation adjusted $100 band of the statewide average for each
district type. Hearing on H.R. 3850, The Fair Chance Act, Before the Subcomm. on
Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Education of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (statement of Arthur Wise) [hereinafter Hearing on
H.R. 3850]. In Seattle, the Washington Supreme Court expanded the fiscal
neutrality concept espoused in Serrano by deciding that a minimal level of adequate
education is required by the state's constitution. The court rejected revenue
shortfalls as an excuse for the state's failure to provide adequate funding for the
necessary minimal education. Washington has since adopted a finance plan that
depends heavily on state support. Michael W. LaMorte, Courts Address Wealth
Disparity,11 EDUC. EVALUATION AND POL'Y ANALYSIS 10 (Spring 1989).

769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989), modified, 784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990).
5Id. at 685.
Id. at 686.
" Id. In addition, there were some nonbudgeted funds for items such as food
service and traffic education. Id.
8Id.
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and Public Law 81-87489 funds to raise revenue in excess of the
standard revenue. 9' The result of this funding scheme was that 35%
of all budgets were obtained from the local level of funding.9'
According to the court, the plaintiffs' evidence established
great differences in spending per pupil in similarly sized districts9'
and indicated that the spending disparity resulted in unequal
educational opportunity.' According to the testimony of plaintiffs'
experts,9 accepted by the court as valid findings of fact, the
wealthier schools offered more enriched and expanded curricula, and
were better equipped with textbooks, instructional equipment, audioIn addition, the
visual materials, and consumable supplies."
wealthier schools had better maintained buildings and facilities than
Another study, commissioned by the
the poorer districts. 9'
intervenor plaintiff, the Montana Education Association, s'
established that the wealthier districts had more science classes and
larger, more well-stocked science labs, which contained more
consumable supplies and storage areas, and which were generally
more functional than those in the poorer schools. ' As a result, the
students in the wealthier schools received more "hands-on" learning
experiences than the students in the poorer districts. 9 In addition,
the wealthier districts offered a wider and more enriched range of
courses in language arts, physical education, music arts, and gifted
and talented programs. These schools had more computers, libraries
with larger and newer collections, larger periodical collections, larger
Federal Impact Aid Act, P.L. 81-874, codified as 20 U.S.C. § 236. (1988). This
statute provides for financial aid to school districts where there is a burden placed
upon the schools due to the presence of children of federal employees, such as
military families.
oHelena, 769 P.2d at 686.
Id. In contrast, in 1950, local funding constituted only 20% of total school
budgets.
92Id.
93Id.

94 Id. at 687-88 (citing RON MATISON, ET AL., DOES MONEY MAKE A DIFFERENCE

IN THE QUALITY OF EDUCATION
"Helena, 769 P.2d at 687.

IN THE MONTANA SCHOOLS?).

9Id.

Study of Dr. Gary Gray, cited in Helena, 769 P.2d at 687.
Helena, 769 P.2d at 687.
9Id.
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reference collections and more audio-visual equipment."00
The trial court found that the spending disparity and
resultant educational opportunity disparity did not pass even the
rational basis equal protection test. The court concluded that the
principle of local control did not excuse the spending disparities and
that the state's budgetary difficulties were not a legal defense to the
inequities. 101 The trial court also held that education is a
fundamental right in Montana, pursuant to the state constitution,
10 2
warranting strict scrutiny of any unequal provision of education.
Whereas the trial court decided the case on both equal
protection and education clause grounds, the Montana Supreme
Court based its decision on only the education clause issue, declining
to decide a constitutional issue unnecessarily." The supreme court
found that the education clause of the state constitution' °4
10' Id. at 688.
101

Id.

o Helena, 769 P.2d at 687.
10 The Montana Supreme Court did not, therefore, decide whether education
is a fundamental right according to the state constitution. A general principle of
constitutional law is that when a case presents two issues, only one of which is a
constitutional issue, the court will decide only the nonconstitutional issue, if a final
outcome can be determined from that issue alone. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 150-52 (1988). This principle is often utilized by
courts when the issue presented is socially or politically controversial. See, e.g.,
Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941)
(The complaint . . . undoubtedly tendered a substantial

constitutional issue. It is more than substantial. It touches a
sensitive area of social policy upon which the Federal courts
ought not to enter unless no alternative to adjudication is open.
Such constitutional adjudication plainly can be avoided if a
definitive ruling on the State [or alternative] issue would
terminate the controversy);
Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 213 U.S. 175 (1909) ("Where a case in this
court can be decided without reference to questions arising under the Federal
Constitution, that course is usually pursued and is not departed from without
important reasons."). Although in Helena both were constitutional issues, the equal
protection question is of greater consequence and therefore went undecided.
'0' MONT. CONsT., art. X, § 1 provides:
(1) It is the goal of the people to establish a system of education
which will develop the full educational potential of each person.
Equality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person
of the state.
(3) The legislature shall provide a basic system of free quality
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guaranteed equal educational opportunity to each person in the state,
disagreeing with the state that the constitutional provision was
intended merely as an aspirational goal. The court held that because
the state failed to fund the foundation program adequately,'05 it
forced an excessive reliance on permissive and local levies. As a
result, the state had failed to provide a system of quality public
education granting to each student the equality of educational
opportunity guaranteed under the state constitution. 106 The state
supreme court's decision was clear; the school finance system
violated the state constitution and it was the responsibility of the
legislature to remedy the violation by implementing a new finance
scheme."° The court did grant the legislature six months to
remedy the situation, specifying that the court's own holding would
not be effective until six months after announcement of the
decision.1"
The court weakened its stance somewhat on January 4, 1990
when it released a modification to its original decision. °9 The
modification extended the legislature's time within which it was to
reform the school finance system. The state legislature had been
unable to enact a new law during the regular 1989 session and was
called into a special session. On June 30 and July 17, 1989, the court
issued orders delaying the effective date of the ruling of
unconstitutionality. Extensive legislation was subsequently enacted
and approved by the Governor. Accordingly, the court permitted
public elementary and secondary schools. The legislature may
provide such other educational institutions, public libraries, and
educational programs as it deems desirable. It shall fund and
distribute in an equitable manner to the school districts the
State's share of the cost of the basic elementary and secondary
school system.
1(s The foundation program refers to the state equalization aid program that
typically guarantees a certain foundation level of expenditure for each student,
together with a minimum tax rate that each school must levy for education

purposes. The difference between what a local school districts raises at the
minimum tax rate and the foundation expenditure is made up in state aid. See
DEBORAH A. VERSTEGEN, SCHOOL FINANCE AT A GLANCE 126 (1990).
" Helena, 769 P.2d at 690. For obvious reasons, no one seems to question

whether poorer schools are successful. Opponents of school finance argue, instead,
that additional dollars will not remedy the poor schools' failure.

17 Id.at 693.
108 Id. The court retained jurisdiction over the case until that time.
"0Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Montana, 784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990).
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until July 1, 1991 for the new scheme to be implemented."' The
plan was implemented by the deadline; however, shortly thereafter
most of the plaintiffs filed a new lawsuit asserting that the steps
taken had been insufficient."'
Another recent case decided in favor of the plaintiffs is Rose
v. Council jbr a Better Education, Inc."' Plaintiffs' challenge was3
based on the education clause of the Kentucky state constitution"
and sought a declaratory judgment that the existing state common
school system was unconstitutional.1 4 The complaint included
allegations that the system of financing was inadequate, that it placed
too much emphasis on local board resources and that it resulted in
inadequacies and inequalities throughout the state resulting in an
"inefficient" system of common schools. 115
The trial court ruled that education is a fundamental right
under the state constitution and that the existing system offered to
students in property poor districts a minimal level of education,
inferior to that offered to students in the more affluent districts." 6
Like the Montana Supreme Court, the Kentucky Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's decision, striking the entire common
school system as unconstitutional." 7
110 Id. at 413.

"'Telephone Interview of September 30, 1991 with Legal Department of
Montana State Government Office of Public Instruction; Helena Elementary Sch.
Dist. v. Montana, BDV-91-1334 (Cty. Ct. Mont. filed Aug. 16, 1991).
112 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).

KY. CONST. § 183 provides: "The General Assembly shall, by appropriate
legislation, provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the
state."
...
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 190. Plaintiffs were the Council for Better Education, a
non-profit corporation whose membership consists of sixty-six local school districts
in the state, the Boards of Education of the Dayton and Harlan Independent School
Districts, and the school districts of Elliott, Knox, McCreary, Morgan and Wolfe
Counties, and twenty-two public school students and their parents. Id.
113

115 Id.

116 Id. at

191-93.

11'Id. at 215. The state supreme court described the existing system as one
which was comprised of two types of state funding: the minimum foundation
program (MFP) and the power equalization program (PEP). Id. at 194-95. The
minimum foundation program was a contribution made by the state to local school
districts, allocated on the basis of classroom units which were determined by the
average daily attendance in each grade. The funds from this program could be
used for teacher salaries, current expenses, capital outlay, and transportation of
students. Id. at 196. The MFP provided between $17,240 to $28,360 per unit based
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The court described Kentucky's history with regard to
equalization attempts and characterized it as a process where "every
forward step taken to provide funds to local districts and to equalize
money spent for the poor districts has been countered by one
backward step.""' 8 The court included a lengthy description of the
disparities which exist in the Kentucky school system and relied on
both the plaintiffs' and the state's evidence to support its conclusion
that the wide variations in financial resources result in unequal
educational opportunity." 9 The expert witnesses had testified that
poorer schools experience substantial differences in curricula, lower
achievement test scores, and higher student-teacher ratios. 20 The
testimony also indicated a great disparity in teachers' salaries, the
provision of basic educational materials, the quality of basic
management, and the size, adequacy and condition of physical
facilities. 2 ' The court accepted the testimony as practically
uncontroverted, stating that "[tihe tidal wave of the [plaintiffs']
evidence literally engulfs that of the [state]."" In summary, the
court stated, "Students in property poor districts receive inadequate
and inferior educational opportunities as compared to those offered
to those students in the more affluent districts."' 23
The court indicated that the experts testified, without
exception, that the disparities had a substantial effect on the basic
educational opportunities of the children in the poorer districts' 2
and that data evidenced a definite correlation between the money
The
spent per child and the quality of education received."
on a statewide teacher salary schedule, $5,421 per unit for current expenses, $1,800
per unit for capital outlay, and a formula allotment for pupil transportation. The
state funded the entire cost of the MFP. VERSTEGEN, supra note 104, at 7. To
determine the PEP, the Department of Revenue determined the equalized fair cash
value of all taxable property in each local district. The Superintendent of
Instruction then determined annually the maximum tax rate that the PEP would
equalize and applied an equal rate to all districts. In order to receive funds the
district had to levy a minimum equivalent tax rate of $0.25 per $100 of valuation
or the maximum rate supported by the PEP, whichever was greater.
118 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 196.
119 Id. at
120

197.

Id.

12 Id. at
'",

123

198.
Id. at 197.

Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 197.

Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 198.
125Id.
12
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financing effort by local districts was denounced by the court as
being a sort of "jigsaw puzzle" which resulted in disparities in per
pupil expenditures reaching thousands of dollars per year.126 The
court held, therefore, that the entire school system of Kentucky was
unconstitutional and that the state constitution places an absolute
duty on the General Assembly to "re-create, re-establish a new
system of common schools in the Commonwealth."127 In addition,
if the General Assembly were to delegate any of its responsibilities
to the local school boards, it "must provide a mechanism to assure
that the ultimate control remains with the General Assembly, and
assure that those local school districts also exercise the delegated
duties in an efficient manner."' 28
12 Id. at 199.
"7 Id. at 215.
'" Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 216. Earlier in its opinion the court provided a lengthy
discussion of the original intent of the framers of the Kentucky constitution and of
legal precedents regarding the meaning of the education provision of the
constitution, in order to properly interpret the provision's requirements. The court
set forth a number of criteria required by the constitutional mandate of an efficient
school system, which were to be considered by the state legislature in reforming
the system. Id. at 205-13. The criteria include that:
[Education] is available to all Kentucky children.... Schools are
operated under the premise that an adequate education is a
constitutional right .... Sufficient funding provides each child
an adequate education .... An 'adequate education' is defined
as one which develops the following seven capacities:
a. Communication skills necessary to function in a complex and
changing civilization.
b. Knowledge to make economic, social, and political choices.
c. Understanding of governmental processes as they affect the
community, state and nation.
d. Sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of one's mental
and physical wellness.
e. Sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to
appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage.
f. Sufficient preparation to choose and pursue one's life's work
intelligently.
g. Skills enabling students to compete favorably with students
in other states.

LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N, A GUIDE TO THE KENTUCKY EDUCATION REFORM

ACT OF 1990, at 2-3 (1990) (summarizing the Rose opinion, see Rose, 790 S.W.2d at
212-13).

The court also made a great effort to rebut the state's argument that the
court does not have the authority to dictate action to the General Assembly. Id. at
205-06, 213.

19911

NOTES

After the court's decision in Rose v. Council for Better
Education, the General Assembly and Governor of Kentucky formed
a Task Force on Education Reform, which provided
recommendations to the General Assembly."
The Assembly
ultimately enacted the Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990,1-'
a comprehensive statute that restructures the state's school
system."' The school finance sections of the Act establish a state
fund that is to guarantee a certain amount of money per pupil
throughout the state. 32 The Act also provides that adjustments to
this fund will include the costs of educating at-risk childrenlm
educating exceptional children, and transportation costs in the
district. Funds are also provided for students who need additional
time to achieve educational goals, for the establishment of family
resource centers and youth services centers in eligible districts. The
Act also requires a minimum level of local support greater than that
previously required.'3
In May, 1984, school districts and individuals in Texas filed
suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the same school finance
system that was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1973,13s was
12 LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N, supra note 128, at i.
" The 1990 General Assembly approved the House Bill 940, which was signed
by Governor Wallace G. Wilkinson on April 11, 1990. For an excellent overview
of the Act, see LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N, supra note 128.
131 Id.
1 In 1990-91, the amount is $2,305 per pupil; in 1991-92, it is $2,420 per pupil.
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N,

supra note 128, at 11. The calculation of this

amount is based on the previous year's daily attendance and will be fully
implemented by the 1994-95 school year. During the 1990-92 years, the maximum
increase of state funds to any districts will be 25% annually. The minimum
increase to any district will be eight percent in 1990-91 and five percent in 1991-92.
Id. at 12.
'" At-risk in this context means those identified by participation the free lunch
program. LEGISLATVE RESEARCH COMM'N, supra note 128, at 12.
4 Id. at 13; see also VERSTEGEN, supra note 105, at v. The local equivalent rate
is to be $0.30 per $100. of assessed valuation of property and motor vehicles in the
district, and this minimum may be reached through levies on property and through
other levies permitted for general school purposes. Id. Additional revenue may
be provided by school board action. An increase up to 15% of those revenues
guaranteed by the state fund is permitted. Additionally, the state will equalize the
increase at 150% of the statewide average per pupil equalized assessment. Id. For
1990-92 this level is set at $225,000.
" San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See infra note
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unconstitutional under to the state constitution. Although the trial
court in 1987 found the system to be unconstitutional, the litigation
has continued through 1991, as the courts, legislature, Governor, and
residents of Texas have continued to be embroiled in debate over the
funding of Texas' schools." The 1987 decision of the trial court to

strike the school finance law as unconstitutional was affirmed in 1989

by the state supreme court' 3 7 and after a series of procedural
delays," s a newly enacted law was struck by the supreme court on
January 22, 1991.1'9 Both supreme court decisions were decided on
education clause grounds, with the court declining to decide the
equal protection challenges.
In its first decision, the court
emphasized that there were "glaring disparities" in the abilities of the
Texas school districts to raise revenue. Differences in property
wealth were large and as a result, spending per pupil varied
tremendously from the poorer to the wealthier districts."4 This
disparity, said the court, had "a real and meaningful impact on the
1

sWhen the trial court made its initial decision in 1987, it enjoined all state
education funding after the date September 1, 1989, unless the legislature repaired
the constitutional defects. In December, 1988, the Texas Court of Appeals reversed
the lower court, reinstating the school finance system as constitutional. Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 761 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1988). The Texas Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals on October 2, 1989 and reinstated the
decision of the trial court, extending the deadline by which the legislature was to
act to May 1, 1990. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.
1989) (Edgewood 1). Subsequent to the court's decision, the lower trial court
extended the deadline for legislative action to Sept. 1, 1990. After much eleventh
hour work by the legislature, a new school finance law was enacted (Senate Bill 1).
Soon after the governor signed the bill, the district court struck it down, finding the
new law to be unconstitutional as well. The district court, however, also vacated
the injunction mandated by the supreme court and denied all relief. On appeal the
plaintiffs had their relief reinstated when the Texas Supreme Court held that the
district court had abused its discretion in vacating the higher court's injunction and
that the new law was indeed unconstitutional. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991) (Edgewood II). The legislature was sent back to
work on the law and on April 15, 1991 a new school finance plan was signed into
law by the new governor. District court Judge Scott McCown who had previously
rejected two of the legislature's plans as unconstitutional indicated that he
presumed the April law is constitutional. Texas Judge Backs Law on School Aid, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 1991 at A17.

1).

137

Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (Edgewood

sSee supra, note 135.
Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d 491.
'0 Edgewood 1,777 S.W.2d at 392.
"'
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educational opportunity offered" to students."' The court cited the
broader educational experiences available in the wealthier schools,
including extensive curricula, up-to-date technological equipment,
better libraries and library personnel, teacher aides, counseling
services, lower student-teacher ratios, better facilities, parental
involvement programs, and dropout prevention programs, and the
ability to attract and retain experienced teachers and
administrators." Also revealed was the poor course availability
in the poor schools; one city offered no foreign language, no prekindergarten, no chemistry, physics, or calculus, and no college
preparatory or honors program, as well as virtually no
extracurricular activities. 143
The supreme court found that based on these facts, the school
finance system did not fulfill the constitutional mandate that Texas
provide an efficient system of public education. 44 Calling the
existing system "limited and unbalanced," the court required that the
system itself be changed. 45 An important point in the decision was
that the court disagreed that reform would infringe upon and
eliminate local control of schools, stating instead that a truly efficient
system would permit more local control, as the property-poor
districts would be provided with economic alternatives that were not
available with the existing system.' 6
The supreme court's decision to strike the legislature's new
school finance plan, Senate Bill 1, echoed its first decision, yet spoke
The court required that a new plan
in even stronger terms.4
"remedy the major causes of the wide opportunity gaps between rich
The court permitted four months for the
and poor districts."' '
legislature to enact a new finance plan and directed the district court
not to extend or modify its deadline. After much debate within the
' Id. at 393.
142

Id.

143

Id.

'" The relevant section of the Texas constitution provides: "A general diffusion
of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the
people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make
suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public
free schools." TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
"I Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 396-97.
147

Id. at 398.
Id. at 394.

1'

Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 496.

1'
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legislature a new bill was enacted on April 11, 1991, which the
governor signed into law on April 15, 1991.149 This law was
approved by Judge McCown of the Texas state district court on June
17, 1991."s The new law increases property tax revenues by $400
million per year, dictates minimum spending and taxing, and places
a ceiling on what the most affluent districts can spend.'
It also
followed the supreme court's advice, in dividing the state into 188
education regions and mandating that wealthy districts share some
of their revenue within each region.15 2
It appears that there are still problems with the new plan,
namely that the legislature cannot decide how to raise the required
additional $1.6 billion."s Governor Ann W. Richards of Texas is
opposed to the creation of personal and corporate income taxes to
support the new law and a group of affluent school districts have
filed suit against the state claiming that the plan is a "Robin Hood"
approach that takes property tax revenue from the rich districts and
gives it to the poor ones." The Governor has suggested instituting
a state lottery to cover the cost of school finance equalization, but
many religious groups in Texas are opposed to a lottery and the
legislature defeated a proposal for one last year.5 5 At the time of
this writing, no final determination was in sight.
It is not yet clear whether the new plans in Montana,
Kentucky and Texas will remedy the inequities found in their
respective schools. Nevertheless, the court decisions and subsequent
legislative action do reflect a renewed and stricter demand by
plaintiffs and state governments for equalized educational
opportunities. Similar litigation in New Jersey also illustrates the
courts' willingness to overrule precedent and demand change, but is
also demonstrative of the political and emotional obstacles to that
change.
In June of 1990, the New Jersey Supreme Court rendered its
'4 Roberto Suro, Texas Acts to Shift School Money, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 1991, §
1 at 10; 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 20, 351 (Vernon).
' Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, No. 36516 (D. Tex. June 17, 1991).
"s

Suro, supra note 149.

Texas Judge Backs Law on School Aid, N.Y. TIMES, April 16, 1991, at A17.
William Celis III, Texas Lawmakers Confront School FinancingIssue Anew, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 1991, at A10.
152

1s4 Id.

155 Id.
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decision in Abbott v. Burke." The decision was seemingly the final
chapter in a case that had been initiated in 1985, following twelve
years of prior school finance litigation in New Jersey."s7 Plaintiffs'
challenge in Abbott was that the Public School Education Act of
1975," declared facially constitutional in 1976, was unconstitutional
as applied, violating the "thorough and efficient education" mandate
of the state constitution. Upon first evaluation, the New Jersey
Supreme Court decided that the issue was to be contested before an
administrative law judge (ALJ) rather than the courts.'" The ALJ
held extensive hearings to determine whether the existing system did
result in disparities which denied a thorough and efficient education
to the students of the poorer urban districts of New Jersey.6° The
ALJ found that evidence of substantial disparities of educational
inputs, such as course offerings, teacher staffing, and per pupil
expenditures, were related to disparities in school districts wealth,
and that the plaintiffs' districts, as well as other districts, were not
providing the constitutionally mandated level of education. The ALJ
found, therefore, that the inequality of educational opportunity
constituted a denial of a thorough and efficient education and that
this failure was systemic. The ALJ held that the statute and its
funding system were unconstitutional. 161 The ALJ, who has limited
remedial authority, recommended to the Commissioner of Education
a number of options, including a "high foundation" program of
15 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).

1 Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) was the first case challenging the
New Jersey school finance system. The state supreme court, in Robinson, held that
the school finance system (as codified in the State School Aid Law of 1954, N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-1 (West 1968)) violated the state constitution's mandate that
state provide a "thorough and efficient" education. Robinson was followed by a
series of postponements, extensions, threats of court-imposed remedies, and finally,
legislative action. See Robinson II, 306 A.2d 65 (1973), cert. denied sub nom., Dickey
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Robinson III, 335 A.2d 6 (N.J. 1975) (mem.);
Robinson IV, 339 A.2d 193 (N.J. 1975); Robinson V, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (Public
School Education Act of 1975 declared facially constitutional); Robinson VI, 358 A.2d
457 (N.J. 1976); Robinson VII, 360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976). For a general history of New
Jersey school finance case law, see Richard D. Ballot, Note, State Constitutional Law,
21 SEroN HALL L. REv. 445 (1991).
s N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A, Subt.4A (West 1991).
1
Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985) [hereinafter Abbott I].
160 Abbott, 575 A.2d at 364.
161

Id.
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funding. 2 The Commissioner, however, refused to accept the
AL's findings and ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to show a
relationship of educational expenditures to the quality of education
offered, the educational opportunity offered, and whether input was
related to output.163 When the Board of Education adopted the
Commissioner's position, the New Jersey Supreme Court certified the
plaintiffs' appeal, bypassing the New Jersey Appellate Division.'"
In the appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the Act "as
applied is systemically productive of such financial and educational
disparities as to render it unconstitutional .... .06 The finance
system as it existed under the Act was based on a limited equalizing
of the taxing power of districts. The state employed a guaranteed tax
base approach based on pupil units,'" enabling all school districts
to raise funds as if their tax base were at least 134% of the average
school district tax base. 67 The school districts set the tax rate as if
the real property of the district equaled this guaranteed tax base
(GTB).'" The local tax base revenues generated from the district's
actual tax base were then supplemented by state equalization aid, in
an amount that, when added to the local revenues, equaled what that
tax rate would have produced if applied to the GTB.'69 Districts
with tax bases greater than the GTB would not receive any
162

Id.

163

Id. at 364-65.

I" Id. at 365.
16 Abbott, 575 A.2d at 366.
'" VERsTEEN, supra note 105, at 11.
167Abbott, 575 A.2d at 377. Tax base means the district's equalized property
valuation per pupil. Id.

State aid is the greater of two alternative calculations: (1)a state
support ration is computed for each district on the basis of local
wealth relative to the GTB ($492,054 for 1989-90). This ration is
applied to the lesser of the prior year's net current expense
budget or the maximum support budget (a dollar amount that
varies by districts type times the district's resident enrollment);
(2) the state support ratio is calculated from a "minimum aid"
tax base ($3,390,100). This ration is applied to 10% of the state
support as of the last school day of September of the pre-budget
year.
VERSTEEN, supra note 105, at 11.
1 Abbott, 575 A.2d at 378.
169Id.
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equalization at all.7

The Act did not require any particular level of educational
expenditure in any district; according to the court, the only effect of
the plan was that the state paid a portion of the school budget
determined by the district. 17' As found by the court, the Act
imposed no limit on a district's ability to tax and spend.
[The equalization aid attempts to obliterate the
enormous disparity between rich and poor for school
tax purposes; [however,] it creates... two different
classes: those districts with a guaranteed tax
base-almost two-thirds of the districts in the
state-and those with a tax base in excess of the
running from
guaranteed tax base of $223,100,
172
....
million
$7.8
to
$223,667
The supreme court noted that a limitation on the equalization aid
appeared to be significant in its ineffectiveness: the amount of
equalization aid that a district was to receive was based on its budget
of the previous year. This would become an important issue in the
legislature's attempts to remedy the constitutional violation in 1990
and 1991.1' The court also recognized that districts with property
valuation above the guaranteed tax base were provided with
minimum aid by the state and stated that this aid was an
170

Id.

171 Id.

Id. at 378.
See Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for the Court to Assure
Implementation of its Decree in Abbott II, Abbott v. Burke, No. 30433 (N.J. filed
June 11, 1991) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Brief]. Other limitations noted by the court,
but found to have little significance for the poorer districts were (1) that the budget
cap restricted annual increases in school district budgets to a certain percentage
over the prior year, but allowed low spending districts to increase more rapidly
than higher spending districts. The court warned that this restriction affected the
17

173

equalization aid by limiting the total budget on which such aid was based and (2)
that if a district with a lower tax base per pupil than the guaranteed tax base
nevertheless spends more than the statewide average expenditure per pupil, it will
receive equalization aid even for the excess expenditure up to the point where the
sixty-fifth percentile of all districts. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 379.
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expenditure that was counter to equalization. 74
In fact, nine years after implementation of the Act, per pupil
spending disparities had widened from $898 to $2,068, or $1,135
adjusted for inflation."7s In dollar terms, said the court, this
funding disparity meant that "a group of richer districts with 189,484
students spend 40% more per pupil than a group of poorer districts
with 355,612 students
... . 176 As the court readily acknowledged the disparity in dollar
amounts spent per pupil, the critical aspect of the court's decision
was that it agreed with the plaintiffs that the "disadvantage in
expenditures per pupil is clearly related to all of the other aspects of
poverty that define poorer urban districts and their youth."'" The
court indicated the statistical relationships which show that the
poorer the district, the less per pupil expenditure, and the poorer and
more urban the district, the heavier its tax burden, the greater the
school tax burden. In general, the greater the need, the less there is
to spend."B Admitting that such correlations do not necessarily
indicate a causal relationship, the court contended that "the strength
and consistency of the relationship between dollars per pupil and
these other factors convince us that there is such a causal relationship
179

Having accepted that unequal expenditures do impact the
groups represented by the plaintiffs, that is the poorer, urban
students, the court still had to answer whether the level of education
provided to these children was constitutionally infirm. The plaintiffs
failed to prove that for every district in New Jersey the funding level
was below that necessary to achieve a thorough and efficient
education; in fact the plaintiffs did not prove that a thorough and
efficient education did not exist in all districts. But as to certain
districts - the poorer urban districts - the constitutional failure was
"glaringly clear"'" and, in the court's eyes, the existing funding
Abbott, 575 A.2d at 379. The court also included a discussion of categorical
aid, transportation and pension aid, and federal aid such as Chapter One funds (see
Strengthening and Improvement of Elementary and Secondary Schools Act, 20
U.S.C. §§ 2701-3386). Id. at 380-82.
17 Id. at 383. See also Ballot, supra note 157, at 452 n.51.
'76Abbott, 575 A.2d at 383.
177 Id.
174

178

Id.

'Id. (emphasis in original).
"0 Id. at 393.
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mechanism would never overcome
the barriers to achieving a
8
thorough and efficient education.1 '
One of the primary factors relied on by the court to support
this proposition was the concept of municipal overburden. 82
Whereas many courts have shied away from confirming the validity
of municipal overburden, the Abbott court did so ardently. The court
found that the poorer urban school districts do in fact suffer from
severe municipal overburden and are reluctant to raise taxes for
school purposes, as their local tax levy and their school tax rates are
well above average."8 It would be impossible for the poorer urban
districts to raise enough tax money to achieve a thorough and
efficient education due to the real "social and economic pressures on
municipalities, school districts, public officials, and citizens of these
disaster areas ....11184

The other factors relied on by the court, in holding that the
statutory scheme was unconstitutional as applied to the twenty-eight
poor urban districts, were the data concerning not only financial
disparities, but educational disparities, in the form of both inputs and
outputs."s
Examples cited by the court are numerous and
profound. For example, whereas wealthier districts offer several
modem science laboratories with built-in equipment, most poor
urban districts have only labs that were built in the 1920s and 1930s,
with sinks that do not work and insufficient supplies and
equipment."4 In fact, in one poor urban district, teachers wheel a
science cart into a three-foot by six-foot science area for instruction.
181 Abbott,

575 A.2d at 394.

Id. The court defined municipal overburden as:
the excessive tax levy some municipalities must impose to meet
governmental needs other than education. It is a common
characteristic in poorer urban district, a product of their
relatively low property values against which the local tax is
assessed and their high level of governmental need. The
governmental need includes the entire range of goods and
services made available to citizens: police and fire protection,
road maintenance, social services, water, sewer, garbage
disposal, and similar services.
Id. at 393.
183 Id. at 393.
182

18.Id.
5 Id.

at 394.
at 394-400.

'm Abbott, 575 A.2d at 395.
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The area contains a sink, but no water, gas, or electrical lines. 8 7
Disparities in foreign language, computer, music, art, and physical
The physical
education instruction are similarly dramatic."M
to
meet
the
thorough and
also
fail
facilities in the poor urban districts
efficient requirement. Many of the poorer districts operate schools
that are literally crumbling." 9 Repairs go unattended; problems
with heating and ventilation systems, plumbing and electrical
systems, as well as needed structural, repairs, plastering and painting,
and asbestos removal and containment are familiar afflictions in
these districts."9 Other factors typically regarded as indicators of
educational quality were also examined: relationships between the
wealth of the school district and the student teacher ratios, average
experience of teachers, and teachers' average level of education have
been shown to be significant. 9 The court concluded that all these
factors are genuinely tied to district wealth, as virtually all of them
carry high costs.192
With regard to educational, output, the court found that in
1985-86, all but two of the districts characterized as poor and urban
had failed to meet the state standard for the high school proficiency
test.193 Dropout rates also soar in poor urban districts. In some
urban high schools the rate is as high as 55%.19' The Abbott court
also recognized that the students in poor urban districts enter school
with significantly greater needs than the average suburban child 95
1v Id.
18

Id. at 396-97.

'

Id. at 397.

190 Id.

191Abbott, 575 A.2d at 399.

Id.
Id. at 400. The Commissioner of Education requires a passing score by 75%
of the district's students in grade nine. In Newark, for example, one of the poorest,
urban school districts, only 41% of the ninth graders passed the reading portion,
31% passed the math and 39% passed the writing. Similar scores were found in
nearly all the poor urban districts. In several wealthier, suburban districts, in
contrast, 97% passed reading, 93% passed math, and 95% passed writing. Id.
'" Id. at 401. The Department of Education (DOE) reports the dropout rate of
twenty-three urban schools to be only 11%; however this figure is very misleading
as it represents only those students who formally withdrew from school. A 1985
study prepared for the DOE reflects a measurement that includes those students
who simply stopped coming to school as well those who formally withdrew. Id.
at 401 n.35.
192
1

195 Id.
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and stressed that those students are entitled to an education that
addresses those disadvantages. Although the court did not venture
to prescribe new educational programs, it did suggest that
"something quite different is needed."1
Many students in poorer urban districts do not have
books at home. These students obviously need
adequate libraries and media centers. [They are faced
with] problems associated with unwanted
pregnancies, drugs, crime, or unsupportive families.
...

[C]risis counselors and career counselors from

elementary school through high school may be
needed to assist students to overcome obstacles and
receive a worthwhile education."
The court stated that these children certainly do not need the
additional disadvantage that they are currently suffering from the
educational system and the law entitles them to even more than a
"regular education" in order to overcome the serious impediments
with which they begin.1' Critical to the court's opinion is that it
found that this "something extra" is commanded by the state
constitution:
A thorough and efficient education requires such
level of education as will enable all students to
function as citizens and workers in the same society,
and that necessarily means that in poorer urban
districts something more must be added to the
regular education in order to achieve the command of
the constitution.199
And so, with its findings, the New Jersey State Supreme
Court struck the school finance law as unconstitutional as applied to
1-Abbott, 575 A.2d at 395.
197

Id.

19 Id. at 402-03.
199Id. at 403.

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. IX

the twenty-eight poor urban districts. 0' The eloquent decision was
regarded as a landmark in school finance reform and eyes turned to
the legislature, awaiting the construction of a remedy. To the
disappointment of the plaintiffs, adequate reform has not been
accomplished, despite the Abbott decision. 1
After the Abbott decision, the state legislature enacted the
Quality Education Act (hereinafter the QEA I) on July 3, 1990.202
A comprehensive and complicated statute, on its face the QEA I
would provide more money to the urban districts, beginning in the
1991-92 school year.'
Much of this money was to come from
large income tax and sales tax increases, in addition to the transfer
of state education aid from 220 affluent suburban districts to inner
cities and middle income suburban and rural districts. 4 This plan
drew heated criticism from New Jersey residents and school
administrators in the affluent districts.' 3 The legislature responded
to the public outcry by substantially amending the QEA I,° less

than one year after it was enacted. 7 According to the plaintiffs in
Abbott v. Burke, the amendments (hereinafter the QEA II), "effectively
abandoned earlier attempts to conform to the Court's order."2 '3
The compromise reached by the legislature reduced by $354 million
the amount of total state aid for education, including a $238.4 million
decrease in funds designated for poor schools.2' In a motion
' The original lead plaintiff in the action, Raymond Abbott, received news of
the court's decision in a small cell of the Camden County Jail. He was a twelve
year old elementary school student when the suit was initiated. He is now a

nineteen year old high school dropout; his reading skills are equivalent to those of
a seventh grader; he is learning-disabled, although he spent eight years in the
Camden, New Jersey public schools, where his problems were never diagnosed.
Raymond Abbott is also now a cocaine addict. KOZOL, supra note 3, at 172 (citing
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 28, 1988)).
2
Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 172.

1990 N.J. Laws 52.
Robert Hanley, Trenton Education ChiefAppealsfor Innovation, N.Y. TIMES, July
4, 1990, at 34.
2u Id.

2 Id.
1991 N.J. Laws 62. The amendments to the QEA I were enacted March 14,
1991.
' New Jersey School Finance Law Goes Back to Court, EDUCATION DAILY, June 14,

1991, at 4 [hereinafter Finance Law].
2 Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 173, at 3.
2

Finance Law, supra note 207, at 4.

NOTES

1991]

asking for the court to assure implementation of its order in Abbott,
plaintiffs contended that a number of elements of the QEA II caused
it to fail to meet the court's requirement that the educational
expenditures of special needs districts will be substantially equivalent
to those of more affluent districts: (1) a reduction of total state aid;
(2) a reduction in equalized state aid; (3) the application of caps to
depress spending for regular education; and (4) the disparate
allocation of state funding.21 ° Additionally, the plaintiffs argued
that the state had failed to assure the necessary levels of funding to
provide for the special educational needs of the children in urban
districts and to address their disadvantages.2 1 Plaintiffs stated that
the amount of "at-risk" aid provided was calculated in an arbitrary
manner, based on an underestimation of the number of New Jersey
children eligible for free milk or
free lunch, which actually reduced
12
the amount of aid per student.
Plaintiffs indicated that as a result of the insufficiencies of the
QEA II, disparities have been exacerbated. A number of cities have
had to cancel plans to hire new teachers, and eight districts will be
forced to lose 169 professional staff members, as well as custodians
and maintenance staff, clerks, secretaries, and classroom aides."
Twelve districts have eliminated plans to extend art and music
programs; seven districts have eliminated or reduced expanded
programs in math education. Four have made cutbacks in social
studies education, seven in foreign language instruction, six in
physical education, and six in language arts and English courses. 4
In addition, plans to upgrade Newark's science laboratories for the
first time in over sixty years have been canceled. Seventeen school
districts that had planned to expand their computer curricula have
had to cancel or substantially reduce their goals. Nine districts have
canceled the purchase of new computer equipment.1
Plaintiffs also revealed the impact of the reduced aid for
programs targeted to at-risk students. Sixteen districts must reduce
their pre-K programs and twelve must reduce the number of full-day
classes. 216 Thirteen districts have canceled plans to extend the
2

Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 173, at 6-17.

211Id.

at 22-25.

212

Id. at 23-24.

2

Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.

214

2
26

Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 173, at 19-20.
Id. at 24.
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elementary school day, four have canceled secondary school day
extensions, and eleven have canceled school year extensions.
Dropout prevention programs have been reduced in sixteen districts
and five districts have eliminated newly planned programs for
teenage parents." 7
As a remedy, the plaintiffs have asked the court to declare
that the QEA II is facially unconstitutional, providing specific
guidance about the ways in which the legislature has failed to assure
that the constitutional requirements of Abbott have been met.218
Also requested is that the court establish December 31, 1991 as an
absolute deadline by which a constitutionally sufficient legislative
response must be in place, specifying that a judicially developed plan
would go into effect upon the legislature's failure to comply with the
deadline. 9 The state did file an answer with the court on July 8,
1991 and the motion was scheduled for a conference with the judge
on July 17, 1991.' ° Any determination of the issue was not clear
at the time of this writing."
C. Remedial Problems with State Court Challenges
As is evident from the above discussion, the results of school
finance litigation have not been very successful, despite the longevity
and persistence of the challenges. Even in states where school
finance laws have been struck down as being unconstitutional,
remedies have not come easily. Initial responses to legislative reform
attempts are often brought back into court, for enforcement,
implementation, or further constitutional evaluation.=
Most
plaintiffs and observers will agree, "There is a pervasive gap between
217
218
219

Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 56-57.

' Telephone Interview with the Clerk of the New Jersey State Supreme Court,
July 16,1991.
' The plaintiff's motion was denied by the court on September 23, 1991,
however, it has yet been determined whether plaintiff will file a motion for
reconsideration. Telephone Interview with the Clerk of the New Jersey Supreme
Court, Nov. 1, 1991.
m' LaMorte, supra note 83, at 8. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d
359 (1990); Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 173.
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right and remedy in most states ....

."'

There are two basic

factors which contribute to the state courts' inability to fashion a
remedy that is both satisfactory to the plaintiffs and other residents
of the state and enduring in its effectiveness. The first is the courts'
deference to the legislatures. Even when a court upholds a school
finance system, it often relies on the separation of powers doctrine
to limit its role in oversight of the remedy. The theory is that judicial
monitoring of the remedial formulation intrudes upon and
undermines the authority of the legislature, which is presumed to
have greater expertise, particularly in areas that involve the taxing
power, which belongs exclusively to the legislative branch.n4
Courts are even reluctant to review legislative inaction because of the
intrusive judicial response this would require.'
Occasionally a
court will appear to cast away this consideration and state that after
a certain date, for example, the court will impose its own remedy,
however, this type of declaration has usually been withdrawn after
the legislature does act pursuant to the court's direction, or after the
court6 grants an extension of time within which the legislature must
22
act.

It has also been suggested that state court judges, although
theoretically removed from politics, are subject to majoritarian
constraints more than federal judges. 7 This is because many state
judges are elected by state citizens and, therefore, are motivated by
pressures similar to those affecting state legislators.'
The other significant cause of dissatisfactory remedies is the
legislature's inability to formulate a satisfactory remedy. Two
reasons have been cited for this inability. The first is that there is a
systemic underrepresentation of the school finance plaintiffs'
interests.' Voters tend to be from the more affluent districts and
may pressure their representatives not to support legislation that will
take money from the wealthier schools in order to support the poor
schools. Second, citizens, in general, are unwilling to pay the higher
' Note, Unfulfilled Promises:School FinanceRemedies and State Courts, 104 HARV.
L. REv. 1072, 1078 (1991).

Id. at 1082.

224

SId.
See, e.g., Helena Elem. School Dist. v. Montana, 784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990)

(postponing deadline for legislative action).
' Note, Unfulfilled Promises, supra note 223, at 1089-91.
id.

2n
22

Id.

at 1078.
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taxes associated with equalization remedies.'
Although most states provide for education which state
courts deem to be a fundamental right, state legislatures and local
schools boards do not, in practice, provide education equally.23
This results in an inadequate and often tragic education for poor
urban students."3 Establishment of a federal standards through the
Supreme Court or Congress would remove discretion from states and
localities, where provincial interests and prejudice may guide
decision-making regarding education. 33 Although the process
would be arduous, such a justification is insufficient to delay a right
as significant as education, as was expressed by Chief Justice Warren
in Brown v. Board of Education, thirty-six years ago.'3 "The state
must provide an education that conforms to the level of participation
self-governing communities expect from the citizenry."' 35
III. THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Although the federal government has the ultimate power to
regulate education so that it conforms to national policies, the federal
government has traditionally deferred decisions regarding
educational policy to the state governments and local school
boards.'
State governments provide the bulk of the financial
support for education and determine the allocation of state money
among the school districts. 37 Local school officials make decisions
2"

Id. at 1078-79.

21

Ratner, supra note 4, at 779. In Chicago. for example, "[bjy a nine-to-one

ratio, according to a recent survey, suburban residents resist all efforts to provide
more money to Chicago's schools." KoZOL, supra note 3, at 67. For more detailed
discussion of the inequality of urban education, see supra notes 15-67 and
accompanying text.

Abbott, 575 A.2d at 366.
Id.

232

M3

z" Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
22 Hubsch, supra note 3, at 99.
236

TYLL VAN GEEL, THE COURTS AND AMERICAN EDUCATION LAw 65-66 (1987).
"[T]he state is, in constitutional theory, the one unit of government that enjoys
inherent and plenary power over education. The state's legal authority will be
assessed with special reference to the control of the local school district." Id.
(footnote omitted). See generally State ex rel Clark v. Haworth, 23 N.E. 946 (N.Y.
1890) (espousing local control of schools).
2 Hubsch, supra note 3, at 98.
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such as choice of curriculum and line-item expenditure.23 8 State
and local officials are considered to have expertise in education
which the federal government and particularly the courts, do not. 39
Reasons for this presumption include the belief that state education
officials have a better understanding of both the correlation between
educational expenditures and the quality of education and the
relationship between state and local officials that is necessary for the
practical administration of education throughout the state. 4' State
officials are also presumed to be in a better position to determine the
goals of education in their respective states.24'
The only instances where the federal government, whether it
be the courts, Congress, or the executive, is willing to intervene with
educational policy is when a school's practice is wholly incompatible
with a national policy, such as segregation of the races,' 2 or when
the federal government provides funding for educational services
targeted to groups with special needs.' With a trend that began
in 1954, with the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
28Id.

See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982) ("[Wle emphasize
that courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified
professional."). The court's deference to the localities is similar to its posture with
regard to administrative agencies' decisions. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) ("Although th[e] inquiry into the facts is to
be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The
court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."). See
generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (Judicial Review).
24oHubsch, supra note 3, at 107 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1973)).
24 Id. "Federalism, according to [San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez],
requires state officials to exercise primaryresponsibility for resolving educational
issues because state officials, including the state judiciaries, have greater education
expertise and greater ability to translate that expertise to the local situation." Id. at
120.
' Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (prohibiting segregated school
systems); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (permitting IRS to
deny tax exempt status to schools which discriminate on basis of race); Abington
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (state action requiring that schools begin
-each day with readings from the Bible is held to be unconstitutional violation of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as applied to states through the
Fourteenth Amendment).
24 See, e.g., Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1%5, 20 U.S.C. §§ 27012854,3232, 3261, 3385(a)-(b); Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1401-1461; Bilingual Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 880b; and Head Start, Pub. L. No.
88-452, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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Education,2' the 1960s and 1970s saw an increasingly activist federal
role, as the government attempted to enforce desegregation orders,
in the North as well as the South.2' Congress enacted a wealth of
education legislation during this period 2' and the federal courts
were willing to recognize constitutional rights which constitute a
"threshold level of protection that no state may deny."247 During
this period the federal Constitution offered perhaps the best
opportunity for success on claims of individual rights, as the federal
courts were willing to raise and maintain this threshold of
protection.2'
Also, in this era, the proportion of local school
revenue that derived from federal aid tripled, shifting from 2.9
percent in 1950 to 9.8 percent in 1978-79.249
The active federal judicial role in education and the increased
volume of requirements for state and local agencies eventually met
with resistance, forcing the federal government to retreat to its more
typically deferential role in education.'
In the face of federalism
concerns, the judiciary replaced active enforcement of federal
guarantees with a balancing approach, weighing "claimed
244 347

U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down purposeful segregation of the races in

schools).
, Beatrice Birman & Alan L. Ginsburg, The Federal Role in Elementary and
Secondary Education: New Directionsand Continuing Concerns,14 THE URBAN LAWYER
471, 472 (1982); Hubsch, supra note 3, at 103.
' See, e.g., title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965), codified as 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-41 (1976), now appearing
as chapter I of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, 20 U.S.C.
§3801 (1982) providing, inter alia, supplemental funding to disadvantaged children;
Civil Rights Act of 1964, title VI, 42 U.S.C. §2000(d) (1982) (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in federally assisted
programs); Education Amendments of 1972, title IX, 20 U.S.C. §1681 (1976)
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender in federally assisted programs);
Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §1701 (1976) (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex or national origin by failing to take
action to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation in educational
programs).
247 Hubsch, supra note 3, at 102.
248Id.
249 VAN GEEL, supra note 236, at 71 n.35. In 1965, the total federal on-budget

funds for education was $5,331,016,000; in 1975, the total was $23,133,209,000; and
in 1980, the total was $34,317,114,000.
NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION
STATISTICS, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR EDUCATION: FISCAL YEARS 1980-1990 40 Table B
(May, 1991) [hereinafter NCES].
' Hubsch, supra note 3, at 103.
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infringement of federal rights against the states' traditional
responsibility, familiarity, and expertise in the provision of publiclyComplex litigation surrounding
funded education. '!2sl
desegregation had strained the federal courts, due to the large
number of parties and the numerous and substantial issues usually
involved. 2 Also, "the relief afforded tend[ed] to be controversial
The
. requir[ing] constant monitoring for compliance."'
Supreme Court's stance became more conservative and less likely to
engage in broad protection of individual rights.'
The Reagan Administration advocated a decentralization of
education, admitting that schools are in need of improvement, but
leaving the states to shoulder the cost of such improvement.'
President Reagan "insisted that education was a state and local
matter and refused to commit additional federal resources .... .,%
The Reagan Administration also decreased federal support for
education from eight percent to three percent, negating the progress
Also imposed were massive program
made through 1979. 25
consolidation and deregulation, all of which diminished the federal
role in education.'
Although the Reagan years rallied strong support for a return
to state control, 259 the dearth of improvement in our schools has
elicited a renewed charge for federal involvement in the education
s Id. at 103 n.47. See, e.g, San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

1 (1973).
2'2 Id. at 103.
2Ws Id.
Hubsch, supra note 3, at 102-03.
GRAHAM DOWN, ASSASSINS OF EXCELLENCE

(1984), reprinted in GROSS, supra

note 8, at 279-80.

2-%
FRED L. PINCUS, FROM EQUITY TO EXCELLENCE: THE REBIRTH OF EDUCATIONAL
CONSERVATISM (1985), reprinted in GROSS, supra note 8, at 340. The only education
issues that President Reagan was willing to support financially were school prayer
and tuition tax credits. Id.
257 EDUCATIONAL VISIONS SEMINAR, supra note 67, at 420. Between fiscal years
1980 and 1990, after adjusting for inflation, federal program funds for elementary
and secondary education declined 15%. NCES, supra note 249, at iii. For detailed
breakdown of the changes in federal support for education during the last decade,
see NCES, supra note 249, in its entirety.
I Birman & Ginsburg, supra note 245, at 471.
2 See generally EDUCATIONAL VISIONS SEMINAR, supra note 67, at 421-22.
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reform.2' As early as 1985, the authors of A Nation at Risk wrote
that "[t]he Federal Government has the primary responsibility to
identify the national interest in education. It should also help fund
and support efforts to protect and promote that interest."2 '
Renewed energy is evident in Congress with regard to educational
policymaking.262 Although the legislature recognizes the history of
deference to localities, newly introduced bills reflect a federal
commitment to implementation of the aspirations of improved
education. The most important such bill in the context of equity was
the Fair Chance Act, introduced by Representative Augustus
Hawkins, in January, 1990.23 Never getting beyond the stage of
hearings, the Fair Chance Act sought to equalize funding of public
schools by requiring that all states meet certain equalization
standards before receiving federal funds for any program
administered by the Department of Education.2
The bill was
asserted to be an exercise of Congress' spending power2' and its
power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment,2' with the
purpose of assuring that states offer "all children a fair chance for a
good education."267
While the bill would probably have
See, e.g., id. at 419-435; PINCUS, supra note 256, at 329-44; MARY ANNE
RAYWID, THE COMING CENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATION (1984), reprinted in GROSS,
supra note 8, at 400-04.
261

supra note 8, at 44-45 (emphasis in original).
e.g., The Fair Chance Act, H.R. 3850, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 23,1990);

NATION AT RISK,

22See,

The Strengthening Education for American Families Act, S.2, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
137 CONG. REC. S449452 (Jan. 14, 1991); Urban Schools of America Act, S.3183,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S14991 (1990).
H.R. 3850, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc H35-02, (daily ed. Jan. 23,
1990) (introduced by Rep. Hawkins). Other bills include the Strengthening
Education for American Families Act, S.2, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC.
S449-452 (Jan. 14, 1991). In his introduction of the Strengthening Education for
American Families Act this January, Senator Edward Kennedy (D. Mass.) stated,

A year ago, the White House and the Governors set out an
ambitious set of education goals for the Nation by the year 2000
Setting goals is the easy part. The hard part is achieving them
...

And the Federal Government cannot simply lay down 'feel

good' goals, wash its hands, and walk away.
Id. at S448 (Jan. 14, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
26

Id.

Id.
Id.
267 Id.
2

2M
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encountered enforcement difficulties, it was, at least, an attempt to
develop uniformity of school funding, thereby equalizing educational
opportunity.
It has become apparent that the quality of urban education
has fallen to a crisis level and as such contravenes national policy,
specifically regarding the mandate of equality of education. The
disparity between the quality of education for the poor and
minorities as opposed to more affluent children should, therefore, be
addressed by the federal government.2' The federal government's
action must directly confront this disparity; plans such as America
2000,' 6 President Bush's set of goals for educational improvement
fail to address issues of equity.27 Additionally, while it provides
suggestions, goals, and aspirations for the direction of reform in the
upcoming nine years, America 2000 leaves virtually all revenue
raising and much of the implementation to the states and local
communities who are already struggling to achieve a modicum of
268ARVAL

A. MORRIS,

THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION 30

(1989); Ratner, supra note 4, at 780 ("[P]ublic policy is not self-enforcing. For its
requirements to be enforceable, they must be given the power of law."). For an
excellent overview of federalism concerns in education, see EDUCATIONAL VISIONS
SEMINAR,

supra note 67, at 419.

2 GEORGE BUSH, AMERICA

2000 (1991) [hereinafter

AMERICA

20001.

270See generally Harold Howe III, Seven Large Questions for America 2000's
Authors, in VOICES FROM THE FIELD: 30 ExPERT OPINIONS ON AMERICA 2000, THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY TO "REINVENT" AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 26 (William

T. Grant Found. Comm'n on Work, Family and Citizenship et. al. eds., 1991)
[hereinafter VOICES FROM THE FIELD] ("[A]bsent is any recognition of the unfair
distribution of educational services in the U.S.A. Today's poor and minority
families are generally served by ill-supported schools, while white middle- and
upper-class families attend public schools more adequate in every respect"); Jose
A Cardenas, Widening, Not Narrowing,The Gap, VOICES FROM THE FIELD 28, 29 ("The
initiatives fail to address the need for sufficient investment in the education of
children, let alone the innovative and equitable distribution of limited existing
resources."); Siobhan 0. Nicolau, Mere's the Carrot? Where's the Stick?, in VOICES
FROM THE FIELD 30, 31 ("Choice [programs, recommended by America 2000,] will fail
the poor, and therefore will fail the nation, unless we target the at-risk as a priority
group.. . ."); Bernard C. Watson, Ignoring Social Dynamite Primed to Explode, in
VOICES FROM THE FIELD

32 ("No distinction is made between schools in grave need

and those that are relatively well-off, between students who are disadvantaged and
those who are not . .. ."); Anne C. Lewis, Educating the New American Student, in
VOICES FROM THE FIELD

34, 35 ("America 2000 celebrates assessments but never

mentions equity or diversity.").
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educational success. 2 ' The federal government needs to take a
more active role in the equalization of public school financing so that
equity among schools can be achieved. 2 A more active role is
entirely consistent with the federal commitment to serving and
assisting groups with special needs and protecting constitutional
rights in the education system. As noted earlier, the children who
are harmed by inequity in school finance are predominantly the poor
and minorities. Because of the lack of resources available to poor
schools, these children are denied their right to equal educational
opportunity. The federal government has long recognized its
obligation to assert and protect the rights of those who are denied
meaningful participation in our society. Almost forty years ago, the
Supreme Court affirmed that when education is provided, "it is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms."' It is
integral to the federal government's responsibility to protect such a
right, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, which ensures that
"[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall... deny to any
274
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has the
authority to legislate to assure compliance with that mandate.'
Such action is not unprecedented: the establishment of a national
standard of prescribed quality would be similar to the order in Brown
v. Board of Education,276 which proclaimed segregation to be a
' "[Sitate and local governments provide more than 90 percent of all education
funding-a responsibility both the president and the governors have concluded
should not be altered." AMERICA 2000, supra note 269, at 39. "[A]t the community
level, it will take all of us-principals, teachers, students, businesses, office holders,
...caring adults and good neighbors-to effect the planning and follow-through
that every America 2000 Community will need. Most of all it will take America's
parents.. .

."

Id. at 23-24.

See Deborah A. Verstegen & Patricia Anthony, Is There a Federal Role in
EducationalReform?, 14 J. EDUC. FIN. 30 (Summer 1988) (citing twenty-five national
'

reports overwhelmingly in favor of federal action in addressing the nation's need
for education improvement).
' Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
zV4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 provides: "Congress shall have the power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the preceding] article."
276 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In fact, since Brown, federal involvement with schools
has increased dramatically. VAN GEEL, supra note 236, at 71. "The proportion of

revenue receipts of local school districts derived from federal aid tripled, starting
in the 1960's, shifting from 2.9 percent in 1950 to 9.8 percent in 1978-79. Congress
passed a variety of pieces of legislation that had enormous implications for the
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violation of the Constitution, due in large part to the essential nature
of education.2' The escalation of education to the status of a
fundamental right is necessary to carry out the policy, particularly in
light of recent changes regarding the necessity of discriminatory
intent in discrimination cases.'
The implementation of this
national standard would impose upon the states a duty to provide
a quality standard of education to all students.' Disparities such
as those between urban and suburban education would be intolerable
by federally mandated standards.
IV. SUPPORT FOR ESTABLISHING EDUCATION
AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

A. Federal Precedent
The problems facing urban public schools can and should be
challenged with legal strategies.m One strategy is to advocate that
the court recognize education as a fundamental right. An equal
protection challenge to the intolerably low quality of urban education
would be subject to the standard of review known as strict
scrutiny.21 The unequal treatment of urban schools as compared
to suburban schools would most likely fail the strict scrutiny
analysis. 2
Although the United States Constitution does not expressly
provide for public education, there is legal support for establishing
education as a fundamental right, thereby affording it the utmost
operation of the public schools." Id. '(footnotes omitted). See also Hubsch, supranote
3, at 108.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
Nadine Strossen, Introduction, 6 N.Y.L. SCH. J.HUM. RTS. 1 (1990). It is now
virtually impossible for plaintiffs to prevail in discrimination cases based only on
disparate impact, but if education were deemed a fundamental right, strict scrutiny
would be applied to a challenge of disparity regardless of the unfortunate

developments in the typical disparate impact cases. David Kirp, Schools as Sorters:
The Constitutionaland Policy Implications of Student Classification, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
705, 739 (1973).

Hubsch, supra note 3, at 104, n.52.
supra note 4, at 780.
SSan Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973)
(infringement of fundamental rights invokes strict scrutiny); see generally Biegel,
supra note 10, at 1079.
' San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 16.
2s0 Ratner,
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constitutional protection.' This view has not yet been accepted by
the Supreme Court;' however, given the current growing
disparity of the quality of education between the rich and poor of
this nation, the issue is approaching ripeness.'8 Courts have held
that in order to be recognized as a fundamental right, the right at
issue must be explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution.' The Court has employed a variety of semantic tests
to determine whether a contested right is fundamental. 7 Early
z Hubsch, supra note 3, at 101; Ratner, supra note 4, at 812.

z The Supreme Court held that education is not a fundamental right in San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In a 5-4 decision,
Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, stating that not every socially
important interest is a right under the Constitution. Id. at 32. See also VAN GEEL,
supra note 236, at 269. However, the Court did concede that education is of
"undisputed importance" and is closely tied to the exercise of the right to vote and
the First Amendment freedoms of expression. The Court even suggested that
"some identifiable quantum of education [may be] a constitutionally protected
prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of [the right to vote and freedoms of
expression.]" San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 36.
The doctrine of ripeness bars courts from deciding cases that are premature too speculative or remote to warrant judicial intervention. See United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (issues were not ripe for adjudication where
plaintiffs sought an injunction preventing enforcement of the Hatch Act because
plaintiffs had not yet been charged with violation of the Act).
Recent failure of urban schools has been recognized by legal, educational, and
sociological scholars. See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 4, at 779; WILLIAM GLASSER,
SCHOOLS WITHOUT FAILURE (1969); JEANNIE OAKES, KEEPING TRACK (1985). Public
opinion has also indicated an emerging awareness of the rapid degradation of
urban education. See, e.g., Lucia Mouat, City School Officials Get Up Head of Steam,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 29,1991, at 7; Diego Ribadeneira, EducatorsSet Rescue
Planfor Urban Schools, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 15, 1991, at 15; Diego Ribadeneira, Can
Anyone Save The Boston Public Schools?, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 23, 1990 (Magazine)
at 16.
' San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 33-34. The Court has examined fundamental rights
in two related contexts: the incorporation controversy and substantive due process.
The incorporation controversy is the debate over which rights from the Bill of
Rights should be applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Substantive due process analysis determines which rights are to be encompassed
by the term "liberty" in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (1947). See generally Ratner, supra note 4, at 823, n.181; Charles Fairman,
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5
(1949); Gottlieb, Compelling Interests, supra note 10, at 921-24.
' Kirp, supra note 278, at 737. See generally Gottlieb, Note, Of Interests, supra
note 10 (historical analysis of determination of fundamental rights).
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cases asked whether the right asked to be recognized was "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty" or "so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."'
A
later case asked whether the right was fundamental to the American
scheme of justice.'" Modem analysis incorporates almost all of the
guarantees under the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment,
affording them the utmost protection from state action7'm
Other types of freedoms and rights have been held to be
encompassed by the term "liberty" in the Due Process Clause and are
therefore afforded the strict review of a fundamental right in due
process and equal protection analysis. 291 Selection of these rights
is typically based on the Court's decision to enforce natural law
rights.'
The Court's ratio decidendi may differ from case to case,
relying on a penumbra theory of guarantees,2 ' a Ninth
Amendment argument,2' or an express natural law approach,29
but the result is the same: that the state may not infringe upon a
fundamental right except to achieve a compelling governmental
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968).

290 Ratner, supra note 4, at 823 n.181.
29

See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma,

316 U.S. 535 (1942). This analysis has changed over time, as evidenced by the
period known as the Lochner era. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). From
the early twentieth century until 1937, freedom of contract was considered by the
Supreme Court to be fundamental. The court used this theory to strike down state
legislation which protected employees by restricting work hours or setting
minimum wages. Id. at 64. Such use of freedom of contract has fallen into disfavor,
but the judiciary's decisions to treat certain rights as fundamental are still based on
notions of what should be protected as fundamental. Gottlieb, Compelling Interests,
supra note 10, at 921-24; Kirp, supra note 278, at 737-39.
The natural law concept was first espoused by Justice Chase in Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). Chase believed that natural law, as well as the
specific provisions of the written Constitution, restricted and regulated government
power. Id. at 386-88.
9 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484 (1965) (majority opinion by Justice
Douglas found a fundamental right to privacy in the penumbras of several explicit
guarantees of the Bill of Rights).
' Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (espousing the belief that the Ninth
Amendment recognized that other rights of equal importance to those explicitly
guaranteed were to be protected against government action).
m' Id. at 499-500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (defending the judicial function of
selecting values that had a historical and philosophical right to be fundamental).
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interest via necessary means.2' The modem Court also awards
such status of fundamentality to the right to privacy or personal
autonomy, in matters usually limited to those involving marriage,
child bearing, and child rearing.'
Education is one of those rights that is so critical that it
warrants the nomenclature and standard of review of a fundamental
right.2' The history and legislation regarding education in this
country indicate how education has been "so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."'
Case law also demonstrates a strong history of commitment to
education and evidences that a high degree of personal autonomy is
embraced by our citizens with regard to the education of their
children."
1. General History. - The early stages of education in this country
limited schooling to white, middle and upper class males.'
But
as early as the framing of the Constitution, ideas about the necessity
of education were well formed. 2 Thomas Jefferson regarded
education as "necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively
and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve
freedom and independence."' The writings of Jefferson reflect his
commitment to education. On one occasion he wrote to his friend
George Wythe, "Preach, my dear Sir, a crusade against ignorance;
establish and improve the law for educating the common
people."'
Another of his writings states: "I know of no safe
depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people
themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (setting out strict scrutiny
standard); Gottlieb, Compelling Interests, supra note 10, at 968.
' Gottlieb, Compelling Interests, supra note 10, at 928-29; Ratner, supra note 4,
at 823; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (state action prohibiting abortion violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
Kirp, supra note 278, at 739-40.
Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
30 Kirp, supra note 278, at 739.
'
AKES, supra note 285, at 16.
2

DAVID TYACK, ET AL., LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION,

1785-

1954 (1987) at 15. "The political ideology underlying the common school was
consistent . . .

- that public education was necessary to sustain republican

institutions .... Id.
303 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
TYAcK, supra note 302, at 23.
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their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take
it from them, but to inform their discretion by education."'
Others of our nation's founders expressed that a commitment to
In George
education would safeguard the new republic.'
should
stated
that
"public
opinion
farewell
address,
he
Washington's
be enlightened" in order to lend import to the voices to which
government must respond." In the nineteenth century, education
was considered vital to the maintenance of our political system.3m
This message was clear in a plea for federal support of public schools
by John D. Pierce, Michigan's first state superintendent of public
instruction:
However unpretending and simple in form, our
government is nonetheless effective and perfect. It
proceeds from the people - is supported by the
people - and depends upon the people - and at the
same time restrains and controls the people more
effectually than the most rigid systems of despotism.
But how is this political fabric to be preserved? Only
by the general diffusion of knowledge. Children of
every name and age must be taught the qualifications
and duties of American citizens, and learn in early
life the art of self-control - they must be educated.
And to accomplish this object, our chief dependence
must necessarily be the free school system.'
These examples evidence that this nation was founded on the belief
that education is necessary to our system of government in order for
the people to exercise their enumerated rights and to maintain a
In other words, the indispensability of
cohesive republic.1 0
30

Id.

3W

Id.

307

id.
LAURENCE A. CREMIN, TRADmONs OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 43 (1977).

a- TYACK, supra note 302, at 15 (quoting Report of Committee on Public Lands,
BARNARD'S AM. J. EDUC. 939, 944 (1878); Pierce, Report of the Superintendent of Public
Instruction of the State of Michigan, SENATE J., 1837, Documents no. 7, 28-84, as
quoted in FLOYD R. DAIN, EDUCATION IN THE WILDERNESS 232 (1968)). Educational
theorists such as Noah Webster and Benjamin Rush also argued the necessity of

education to our form of government. Id. at 23.
310

Id. at 15.
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education is implicit in our Constitution
and for that reason should
31
be deemed a fundamental right. '
2. Case Law. - Brown v. Board of Education12 is perhaps the most
critical case whose holding has impacted on the significant role
which education plays in our society. In his often quoted opinion for
a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Warren wrote,
Today, education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments. Compulsory
school attendance laws and the great expenditure for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It
is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the armed
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment. In these days, it is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected
to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which
must be
313
made available to all on equal terms.
Although Chief Justice Warren was careful to couch his decree in
language that did not expressly provide a right to education, he did
assert that once a state has elected to provide education, it is a right
1 4 Also, and perhaps
that must be available to "all on equal terms.""
more significantly, Justice Warren echoed the writings of the framers,
reaffirming the necessity of education in order to perform the
functions of good citizenry.31 It is this necessity that transforms
311Kirp,

supra note 278, at 739.
U.S. 483 (1954).
313Id. at 493.
314Id. (emphasis added). See supra notes 68-82 and accompanying text for
312347

discussion of the states' educational provisions and their obligation to provide
equal educational opportunity.
313 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. Cf.Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)
(citing writings of Thomas Jefferson).
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education from a privilege to a fundamental right.316
Language in other decisions has also supported the
proposition that education should be one of the primary goals of
government. For instance, in Meyer v. Nebraska,317 the Supreme
Court stated that, "[tjhe American people have always regarded
education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme
importance which should be diligently promoted."318 In 1982, the
Supreme Court held that the state's exclusion of children who were
illegal aliens from public school was an equal protection
violation.1 9 The state's interest in excluding illegal aliens was
insufficient to deprive the children from as personally and socially
an important public service as education.32
This decision
illustrates that the Court has treated education as a fundamental
right, although it has declined from explicitly granting such
status.3 '
Justice Marshall relied heavily on the argument that
education is necessary to exercise other enumerated rights (such as
the right to vote), in his dissent in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez.32 While the majority, Justices Powell, Burger,
Blackmun, Stevens and Stewart, held that there is no fundamental
right of education, Justice Marshall wrote:
"[o]f particular
importance is the relationship between education and the political
process .

. .

. It is this sort of intimate relationship between a

particular personal interest and specific constitutional guarantees that
has heretofore caused the Court to attach special significance, for
purposes of equal protection analysis, to individual interests."3'
Here, Justice Marshall adroitly extracted the nexus between rights
which are fundamental because they are vital to our system of
government and those rights that are necessary to personal
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 97-104, 110-17
(1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
317 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that a criminal statute prohibiting the teaching
of foreign languages was unconstitutional).
318 Id. at 400.
319 Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), reh'g. denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982).
316

321 Id.

' See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (5-4
decision) ("Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection
under Federal Constitution.").
322 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (5-4 decision) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
31 Id. at 113 (footnotes omitted).

210

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. IX

autonomy. In the area of education the two are inextricably
intertwined, calling for even greater reverence to the education of the
citizenry.324
Another line of Supreme Court cases further reveals the ways
in which educational choices are linked with personal autonomy and
therefore are so important that government regulation of those
choices is limited.3'

Pierce v. Society of Sisters326 involved a

challenge to an Oregon statute virtually requiring children to attend
public school.327 The Supreme Court struck down the statute as
unconstitutional because it unreasonably interfered with the liberty
of parents to direct their children's education.32 In Wisconsin v.
Yoder,3' the Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
prevented a state from compelling the children of respondents,
Amish citizens, to attend formal high school until the age of
sixteen.' The Court acknowledged the state's interest in assuring
that its citizens are educated, in order to prepare them to participate
in the political process and to be self-reliant and self-sufficient
members of society. 1 Although the holding of this case was in
favor of the Amish, allowing them to cease formal schooling earlier
than permitted by statute, the opinion incorporates the general
principle that individuals need the liberty to guide their own
education or that of their children in order to reach meaningful
participation in society.

2

Attaining that goal necessitates the equal

3 Ratner, supra note 4, at 782-84.
See generally VAN GEEL, supra note 236, at 16-17.
326268 U.S. 510 (1925).
' Id. at 531. The statute did permit some private instruction, but only with
heavy regulation by the county superintendent. Id. at 530-31 n.*.
m Id. at 533-34.
32 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
3 Id. at 234.
31 Id. at 224-25. The state relied on Thomas Jefferson's theory, discussed supra
notes 303-05 and accompanying text. However, the Court found that this interest
cannot interfere with the individual's right of self-direction because the Amish way
of life had already instilled a strong work ethic and self-reliance. The decision in
Yoder also relied on the fact that the Amish's claim was an infringement of their
freedom of religion. Id. at 227. This may have given more weight to the interest
of the Amish in the balance between state and individual interests; however, it is
obvious from the opinion that the Court viewed the Amish as having already
attained the goals of formal schooling, perhaps more effectively than the schools
themselves. Id. at 234.
' Yoder, 406 U.S. at 224-25.
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opportunity of education for all citizens, so that the exercise of other
constitutional guarantees, such as voting and expression, is available
to all. 3
Although the Court did come close to establishing education
as a fundamental right nearly twenty years ago, the current
conservative swing of the Court suggests that reconsideration of the
issue is not likely. However, as an alternative to the development of
a federal constitutional standard, plaintiffs may find a remedy in
legislative or state-based challenges.
V. STATUTORY CHALLENGES AND LEGISLATIVE REFORM

Congressional legislation also indicates the commitment of
the federal government to equal and adequate education for its
citizens.'
Title Six of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and religion in
the provision of federally assisted programs, including public
education." 7 It would appear that Title Six would apply to the
inequity of urban education just explored due to the disparate impact
of such inequity on minorities who comprise most of the urban
students. Nevertheless, the Court's refusal to recognize disparate
impact as a valid claim of discrimination has foreclosed the
possibility of a successful challenge based on Title Six.
In 1974, Congress enacted the Equal Educational
Opportunities Act.339 This Act illustrates the commitment on the
part of the federal government to ensure that all children receive an
' San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
' San Antonio, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) was a 5-4 decision with a strong dissent by
Justice Marshall.
' Biegel, supra note 10, at 1084. Legislation on the state level mirrors that of
the federal government regarding access to education for all groups. States have
endeavored to guarantee access for the handicapped, the blind, the deaf, and nonEnglish speaking adults. As it does on the federal level, the commitment to equal
education demonstrates that education is a deep-rooted function of our
government. See VAN GEEL, supra note 236, at 117-27.
3

42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
Id.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).

3

Pub. L. 93-380, § 202, 88 Stat. 514 (codified as 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758)

[hereinafter "the EEOA"].
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equal education, regardless of their race, color, sex, or national
The stated purpose of the EEOA is to "specify
origin.'
appropriate remedies for the orderly removal of the vestiges of the
dual school system"' due to the declaration of Congressional
policy that "all children enrolled in public schools are entitled to
equal educational opportunity without regard to race, color, sex, or
The EEOA goes on to provide that "no State
national origin."'
shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual" based on
The EEOA has provided a
the aforementioned characteristics.'
starting point for volumes of legislation designed to reach and
maintain the goal of equal opportunity.?
Recently Congress has endeavored to enact legislation
demanding more federal involvement in the achievement of national
This was precipitated by the
standards of quality education.'
dramatic failure of schools to produce successful students and by the
ensuing proclamations by President Bush " that the federal
government is dedicated to education goals such as elimination of
illiteracy, increases in the graduation rate, higher levels of
competency in challenging subjects such as math and science, and
the eradication of drugs and violence in schools 4 7 Proposed
30

Id.

U.S.C. § 1701(b).
20 U.S.C. § 1701(a).
- 20 U.S.C. § 1702.

34120

3" See generally VAN GEEL, supra note 236, at 117, 138, 195, 261-65, 299-301.
Other examples of legislation characterizing the importance of education are the
Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1485; the Adult Education
Act, 20 U.S.C. H8 1201-1213(D); the American Printing House for the Blind
Amendments, 20 U.S.C. §§101-106; the National Reading Improvement Program,
20 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1981; and the Education of the Deaf Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4362.
The purposes of these statutes all reflect an assurance that various groups receive
the type of education that is necessary for them to succeed. These are only a few
examples of the volumes of legislation enacted by Congress with regard to
education, yet they exemplify the significant role that education plays in system of
government.
' See, e.g., Strengthening Education for American Families Act, S.2, 102nd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Urban Schools of America (USA) Act, S. 3183, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., (1990) (introduced by Senator Edward Kennedy as a 'discussion bill' to
be reintroduced during the present term).

' See National Education Goals, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1177 (July 31,

1990).
I Id.; see also 137 CoNG. REc. S448 (Jan.14, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
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legislation has also specifically addressed the crisis of urban
The Fair Chance Act, discussed earlier, is the primary
schools.'
example. 9 The Act sought to affect directly the ways in which
public schools are funded, forcing states to equalize the funding
among urban and suburban schools within and among the states.'
In Congress' last term, Senator Kennedy introduced the Urban
Schools of America (USA) Act."5 To be reintroduced this term, the
bill concentrates on authorizing tangible assistance to urban school,
in three basic forms: grants to city schools for programs that would
move them closer to meeting "national education goals," funds for
urban school systems to renovate and repair their aging facilities, and
additional federal and local research on urban education. 2
If enacted, the USA Act should make considerable inroads to
refute the detrimental reduction of federal funding to education that
The original
took place during the Reagan Administration.'
version of the Act designates funds for programs to increase
academic achievement of urban school children, including the use of
tutoring and mentoring, curriculum development, and supplemental
The USA Act also allocates funds for
academic instruction.'
policies and practices designed to increase graduation rates, such as
in-school youth employment programs, outreach activities to recruit
dropout students, and dropout prevention activities.' Other areas
addressed by the Act are the recruitment of more qualified teachers,
and the implementation of drug use prevention activities. 6
Early this year, the Strengthening Education for American
Families Act was also introduced by Senator Kennedy. 7 Also in
direct response to the President's establishment of national education
Urban Schools of America (USA) Act, S. 3183, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).

u' H.R. 3850, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
350 Id.
" S.3183, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong Rec. 14991, 14992 (1990).
-52 Id. at S.14991.
EDUCATIONAL VISIONS SEMINAR, supra note 67, at 420 (federal support for
education decreased "from 8 percent to 3 percent during the Reagan
Administration, with the sharpest cuts targeting entitlement programs for the
disadvantaged . . ") Id.
S. 3183, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
3 Id.
3 Id.
' S.2, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter SEAFA].
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goals,' this bill confronts the tendency of the federal government
to make proclamations regarding education, without the necessary
follow-up action. 9 Similar in structure to the USA Act, the SEAFA
is not limited to assistance to urban schools.' ° In its findings, the
original version of the bill states that the federal government "has a
responsibility to assist [s]tate and local governments in providing
literacy services to those individuals in need.., so they may be full
SEAFA also codifies the aspirations
participants in society."'
embraced by President Bush and specifies programs which will be
implemented by the federal government in order to achieve those
goals, if enacted.6 2 SEAFA also establishes a mechanism to
monitor the progress of the state and federal governments' progress
toward the education goals.'
These legislative initiatives, if enacted, could prove to be
powerful tools in improving urban schools. As in the fundamental
right analysis, the establishment of enforceable national standards
imposes a legal duty on states and local school districts to provide
quality education to all "on equal terms. '
VI. CONCLUSION

The crisis level to which urban education has fallen demands
affirmative measures. Although a variety of legal strategies exist to
challenge the inequality of education of the poor and minorities who
comprise our cities, the expansion of the federal role in education
and the setting of national, enforceable standards is essential to
progress. The Administration can and should support increased aid
to establishing equity in education, through funding and
programming. Congress can and should champion legislation which
will propose and implement aid to urban schools. And finally, the
Supreme Court should recognize the duty imposed by our founders
to provide equal and quality education to all children.
Inequality of education violates federal and state legislation
See National Education Goals, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1177 (uly 31,

1990).
137 CONG. REc. S448 (an. 14, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).

Id.
61

3

S.2, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).

id.

X3 Id.

' Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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ensuring equal educational opportunity; it violates the mandate of
the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education; and perhaps most
importantly it violates our American notion that anyone can succeed
in our society, given the opportunity. Poor and minority children are
not given that opportunity when the education we provide is
"tragically inadequate." Limiting such opportunity will serve only to
further the collapse of our cities, our labor force, and ultimately our
preservation of the principle of equal protection of the laws. The
import of such collapse is best stated in terms of the children, by
Jonathan Kozol, in Savage Inequalities:
All our children ought to be allowed a stake in the
enormous richness of America. Whether they were
born to poor white Appalachians or to wealthy
Texans, to poor black people in the Bronx or to rich
people in Manhasset or Winnetka, they are all quite
wonderful and innocent when they are small. We
soil them needlessly.'
Brenna Bridget Mahoney

KOZOL, supra note 3, at 233.

